University of Rhode Island

DigitalCommons@URI
Theses and Major Papers

Marine Affairs

1981

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Public Interest Review: An
Evaluation of Implementation Effectiveness
Sharon Kelberg
University of Rhode Island

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/ma_etds
Part of the Natural Resources Management and Policy Commons, and the Oceanography and
Atmospheric Sciences and Meteorology Commons

Recommended Citation
Kelberg, Sharon, "U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Public Interest Review: An Evaluation of Implementation
Effectiveness" (1981). Theses and Major Papers. Paper 109.
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/ma_etds/109

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Marine Affairs at DigitalCommons@URI. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Major Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For
more information, please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.

u.s.

ARMY

~ORPS

OF ENGINEERS PUBLIC INTEREST REVIEW:

AN EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION EFFECTIVENESS
BY
SHARON KELBERG

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULfILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
IN
MARINE AFFAIRS

UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND

1981

MASTERS OF ARTS THESIS
OF
SHARON KELBERG

Approved:
Thesis Committee
Major Professor-6,.....d:c:::z:::.............::=::~=::T-.41-

...

Graduate School

UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND

1981

ABSTRACT
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is authorized to
permit or deny dredge and fill activities in the nation's
coastal and wetland regions.

Originally, responsible only

for the maintenance of navigation, the Corps considered
only navigational requirements in decisions to grant or
deny permits.

Now, however, the Corps must demonstrate

,

that the "public interest" is served as well.

This study

examines the scope of the pUblic interest and attempts to
evaluate the effectiveness of the program in a particularly
controversial project.

The initial phase provides evaluation

criteria necessary to analyze the application of the pUblic
interest review.

The second phase determines the effective-

ness of the review in the Hampton

Ro~ds

refinery proposal.

The results of this analysis suggest that the Corps complied
with all procedural requirements within the broad pUblic
interest mandate.

Factors, however, many of which are

outside of the Corps' jurisdiction, exist which impact
the decision making process.

ii
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION
Overview of Army Corps of Engineers
Public Interest Review Program
Historically, the Army Corps of Engineers has had
a major role in the regulation of coastal activities.

Its

role was originally limited to maintaining navigable waters
unobstructed for the free flow of commerce.

Increasing

public concern expressed over the destruction of coastal
natural resources encouraged the legislative and judicial
branches of the Federal government to expand the Corps'
role to include consideration of factors far removed from
the navigational mandate.

Such factors include the effects

a proposed project would have on wetlands, fish and wi1dlife values, water quality, recreation, and the public
interest (emphasis added).l
The! public interest review has become a particularly
important component in determining whether or not to grant
permits fol:' coastal alteration activit.ies. Before the
Corps can qrant a permit, it must determine that the proposed
activity is in the best public interest.

However, there

is no clear concensus on a definition for public interest.
Consequently, public interest decision making can become
quite difficult.
1

2

The Corps' regulations do not attempt to define
the public interest.

Instead, they list factors from the

categories of economic development, energy needs, environmental protection and the general public welfare which
constitute the pUblic interest.

The Corps is then required

to carefully weigh all factors relevant to each particular
case.

As a result, the Corps must receive on a case by

case basis, all proposals for waterfront development; to
evaluate the economic, environmental and social consequences
of each; and then to permit, deny or modify the proposal
based on the public interest review. 2

During this individual

review process, the Corps is supposed to balance the benefits which may accrue from the proposal with the potential
detriments.

The decision to authorize a permit is there-

fore part of this general balancing process.

3

Such evalua-

tion procedures have transformed the role of the Corps from
a navigational mission oriented agency into a public interest
advocate.

Or as Senator Muskie observed:

"We have put the

fox in the chicken coop and it has become a chicken.,,4
The following study will attempt to determine the
effectiveness of the Corps public interest review program.
To achieve this goal, first, the intent and scope of the
interest review will be revealed through a historical
analysis of legislative and judicial events.

Second, the

Hampton Roads refinery proposal will serve as a case study
to examine the Corps decision making process as related to

3

the implementation of the public interest provision.

Third,

the Hampton Roads decision will be evaluated in light of the
public interest objectives.

Furthermore, it is hoped that

the problems identified and suggestions offered can be used
to improve the pUblic interest review process.
Overview of the Hampton Roads Refinery Project
The Hampton Roads Energy Company (HREC) in March,
1975 applied to the Army Corps of Engineers for permits to
construct a refinery and marine terminal in Portsmouth,
Virginia along the west bank of the Elizabeth River.

The

refinery, initially designed to process 175,000 barrels of
Middle Eastern crude oil per day would eventually be expanded to process 250,000 barrels of crude per day into low
sulfur petroleum products. 5
The refinery would be equipped with an oil spill
containment system and a wastewater treatment system which
would remove much of the oil products and chemicals before
direct discharge into the Elizabeth River, a tributary of
the Chesapeake Bay.6

See figures 1 and 2 for illustrations

of the Bay and refinery location.

4

I

I
I

PROPOSED

Fig-

1

Geoqraphical Configuration of the Chesapeake Bay
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Fig. 2.

Proposed Refinery Location

SOURCE: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Final
Environmental Impact Statement: Hampton Roads Energy
Company's Portsmouth Refinery and Terminal, Portsmouth,
Virginia, August 1977, p.A-19
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The lower Bay, near the Hampton Roads Harbor is the site
of many commercially important fisheries and recreational
opportunities.
resources.

See Figure 3 for locations of these fishery
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Fig. 3.
Roads,

Lower Chesapeake Bay Yishery Resourcea

SOURCE: U.S. Coast Guard, Local Oil Contingency Plan for MSO Hampton
(Norfolk, Virginia), 1 March 1979.
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This portion of the Bay is becoming increasingly stressed
from a wide variety of organic and inorganic pollutants.
Many fear that a new refinery will increase the oil spill
probability to unacceptable levels and could herald the longterm demise of the $78 million oyster and blue crab fisheries.
The qualitative permitting process had persistent
problems at every level.

The Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA), National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Department of Interior (DOl) recommended
denial of the permits while the Departments of Defense,
.

Treasury and Energy (DOE) consistently supported the proJect.

7

At the local level, the City of Portsmouth along with business
and industrial organizations have enthusiastically encouraged
the refinery complex.

Organized opposition has come from

CARE (Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects) along with
special interest groups.

Objection to the refinery has

predominantly been linked to potential impacts on marine
resources, air quality and economic dislocation of Bay
dependent industries.
In October of 1979, Clifford Alexander, Secretary of
the Army, granted the construction permits necessary for
HREC to proceed with the project.

The decision, which cul-

minated after four years of controversy, rested on what the
Secretary deemed to be the best public interest.

In reach-

ing his decision, the Secretary had to balance two very
critical pUblic interest review factors, the national need

9

for energy -- specifically refined petroleum products, and
the value of the unique resources of the Chesapeake ecosystem.

CHAPTER II
METHODS
This study is divided into three sections.

The

first section addresses the scope and intent of the public
interest review.

The second section examines how the

public interest review was implemented in the decision
making process for the Hampton Roads refinery.

The final

section evaluates the adequacy with which the Corps implemented the public interest review in the case example.
spe~ific

The

method of program evaluation utilized in this study

was developed by Englander, Feldman, and Hershman
referred to as organizational process

8

and is

ev~luation.

Organizational process evaluation provides information about organizational capacity by examining the decision
making procedures of a regulatory agency.

The objective of

process evaluation is to identify the adequacy with which
the regulatory agency implements its program and to identify
process problems which limit its effectiveness.
In the present study, process evaluation was performed in the following manner:
1.

The objectives of the Corps public interest review
were addressed through a historical analysis of:
a.

applicable legislation and the corresponding
legislative history;

10

11

2.

b.

judicial interpretation;

c.

program objectives expressed in current regulation.

Brief examples were discussed to determine in actuality
how the public review criteria ware implemented.

Infor-

mation was gathered from:

3.

a.

law review journal arti~les;

b.

interagency correspondence;

c.

interviews with Corps personnel.

The Hampton Roads refinery example was analyzed to
determine how the public interest was implemented in
the decision making process.

First, the public interest

review factors specific to Hampton Roads were examined.
Then the role of these factors in the decision making
process was scrutinized.

Information for both steps

was found in:
a.

the environmental impact statement and consultant
reports;

4.

b.

interagency correspondence;

c.

Corps decision making papers;

d.

interviews with involved Federal and State agencies.

The findings were evaluated in light of the expressed
pUblic interest goals to determine if the objectives
were achieved.

5.

Based on the results of the preceding sections,
suggestions to improve the process were made.
One disclaimer should be noted.

As previously

mentioned, process evaluation involves analysis of a

12

decision making process.

Unfortunately, the criteria for

such an evaluation tend to be difficult to ascertain.
Public interest objectives, as expressed in regulation are
exceedingly broad and frequently conflicting.

Also, much

of the information used by regulatory agencies is qualitative
thereby making evaluation subjective.

Moreove~

procedures

for implementation of the review factors appear to be ad hoc.
Consequently, process evaluation is not a precise procedure
and is not used in this study as such.

CHAPTER III
CORPS ACTIVITY IN THE COASTAL ZONE
Historical Evaluation
The concept of the public interest review was born
from extensive legislative and juqicial

~eview.

Accord-

ingly, understanding of the need and purposes of the public
interest review cannot be presented without examining the
history of the Corps' activity in the coastal zone and the
evolution of this activity through the years.

This section

documents the role the Corps plays in coastal development
and determines the historical factors which provided impetus
for enlargement of its duties.

This examination will reveal

the scope and intent of the public interest review.
Rivers and Harbors Act
Congress created the Army Corps of Engineers in

1802.

Until 1812 it was responsible for frontier defense

construction.

9

Beginning with the War of 1812, its authority

was expanded to inspection of coastal fortifications at
important east coast ports and harbors.

Throughout the

nineteenth century, Congress continued to authorize the
Corps to make improvements in rivers and harbors1but the
purpose of such improvements changed from fortification to
the promotion of navigation.

These projects included

deepening of channels and restoration of harbors.
13

After

14
the Civil War, Congress began to annually appropriate funds
for the improvement of rivers and harbors.

lO

In 1877, the Chief of the Engineers initiated a
proposal which would ensure that harbor areas were protected
from congestion caused by random development of wharves and
piers.

The legislation, known as the "Dolph Bill", met

little success in Congress until an important Supreme Court
ruling rekindled interest.

In 1888, the u.S. Supreme Court

held, in Williamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch that in the
absence of a statutory enactment by Congress, state legislatures could authorize or prohibit the construction of
bridges, dams, etC. in or over waters within the state
. dl ess
regar

0

f wh eth er suc h structures

0 b struc t

ed

. t'~on.
nav~ga

The implication of such a ruling was far reaching.

11

Without

federal legislation stating otherwise, the maintenance of
free, unobstructed navigation would be left to the individual
states.

States could authorize projects which would hinder

the flow of commerce through

.

nav~gable

waters.

12 13
'

In response to the Supreme Court ruling, Congress
passed the Dolph Bill in 1890.

The new legislation, known

as the Rivers and Harbors Act, not only required the approval
of the Secretary of War for construction of all bridges in
navigable waters, but for all construction activities in
navigable waters (emphasis added).

The Act also forbade

the deposition of refuse into navigable waters without the
permission of the Secretary of War.

14

15
In 1896, at the request of Congress, the Chief of
the Corps of Engineers compiled all general laws relating
to navigational waters and proposed revisions and enlargements advantageous to the public interest.

The changes were

incorporated in a draft bill which became the River and Harbors
Act of 1899 (RRA).15

It is interesting to note that this is

the first time the term "public interest" is mentioned in
any act dealing with water resources.
Three sections of the 1899 Act remain in effect
today; two of which eventually helped to shape the present
public interest review.

These sections will be discussed in

their modern context later, but for now it is sufficient to
Section 10 prohibits obstruction

state the purposes of both.

or alteration of any navigable waters unless recommended by
the Chief of the Engineers.

16

Sec~ion 13, better known as

the Refuse Act, made it illegal to discharge refuse into
navigable waters or to place it in areas where it could
easily wash into such waters.

Sewage, however, was excluded

13 requ1rements.
.
.
17
.
f rom Sect10n
Although court rulings eventually expanded the jurisdictional requirements of the RHA considerably, the Corps
initially accepted a limited interpretation of the Act.
First, the Corps concluded that its role was restricted to
harbors only and accordingly, excluded all activities outside of well defined harbor regions from section 10 permit
requirements.

Second, the Corps drew lines within harbor

16
areas where landfills or construction activities were permitted without section 10 authorization.

Section 13 was

rarely used and only then to impose civil or criminal
responsibility on those who discharged waste matter that
directly impeded navigation.
Initially, the courts upheld the Corps' narrow
interpretation of its responsibility.

As late as 1936, in

Miami Beach Jockey Club v. oern,18 the court held that the
applicant for a permit under section 10 was entitled to a
decision based "exclusively on evidence determining whether
or not the project would obstruct the navigational capacity
of the waterway and hence hinder commerce.,,19
Shortly after this decision, however, the courts
began to interpret wider meaning into the

' Power Co. 20
·
Appa I ac h 1an
EI
ectr1c

RHA~

In U.S. v.

' d
t h e respon d ent c Ia1me

that its proposed hydroelectric project was

e~empt

from

regulatory jurisdiction of the RHA because

th~

would be located in non-navigable waters.

The power company

project

used physical stream characteristics such as water depth as
evidence of non-navigability.

The Supreme Court, however,

held that federal power over navigable waters was not
limited to control for the purposes of navigation only, but
was as broad as the needs of commerce.

Water power develop-

ment from dams was, from the pUblic's standpoint, a by
product of the general use of the rivers, for commerce.
Furthermore, the court concluded that flood protection,
watershed development, as well as hydroelectric power and

p.

17
other concerns in

u.s.

waters were within the proper scope
of the commerce power. 2l
The Appalachian Power case significantly redefined
navigability to include all waters, regardless of their
physical characteristics, so long as development in the
water body

~as

within the scope of the commerce power.

While this case dramatically increased the Corps' physical
jurisdiction, U.S. v. Republic Steel 22 expanded the concept
of obstruction in navigable waters thereby expanding the
breadth of the RHA permit requirements.

In the latter case,

the court held that industrial pollution discharged through
the sewers was rightfully classified as refuse and, therefore, violated section 13 of the RHA.
Republic Steel pumped

0,-",

°

water for industrial use and

returned it to the river through the sewer systems.
waste water was heavily laden with particulate

The

~atter

which

floculated in.to larger units and sank to the bottom of the
river.

In time, the depth of the channel was reduced by

several feet..

The Court he Ld that the industrial solids

created an obstruction to 'the navigable capacity and its
discharge was, therefore, a violation of section 10 of the
23
RHA.
The court's decision was based on an interpretation
of the seemingly antiquated 1899 Act.

The Act specifically

excluded sewage from the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction.
The Court, however, held that use of sewers to discharge

¥.:

18
wastes other than sewage violated the section 13 prohibition
against refuse.

The court focused on the type of discharge

rather than the manner of disposal.
These two cases,

~achian

Power and Republic Steel

demonstrate the courts' ability to expand and interpret
jurisdiction under the RHA and exemplify the capacity of the
legal and political processes to respond to changing needs.
Together, they demonstrate that the federal constitutional
system permits the enlargement of federal power to fill voids
even without Congressional action.

The judiciary and adminis··

trative agencies are able to achieve this expansion of power
through the elaboration and interpretation of ambiguous
terms of statutes.

In addition to proving that old laws

can be interpreted to meet new problems, these cases initiated
the era of public interest where future legislative and
judicial review continued to increase thE! Corps' responsibility.
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 1958 Amendments 24
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, as amended,
provides that fish and wildlife conservation will receive
equal consideration with other
development programs.

feat~res

of water resource

The amendments were necessary to

remedy the earlier Act's failure to achieve this goal and
to address problems posed by a rapidly expanding society.
Unlike the amendments, the original Act did not pertain to
dredge and fill projects by private interests or other

19

non federal entities in navigable waters.

This caused

particular concern among commercial fishermen who were well
aware of tha negative impacts dredge and fill operations
have on many important species.
The amendec Act affects the Corps' dredge and fill
permit responsibilities.

Section 2(a) requires the Cor?s

to consult with the U. S. Fish and Wildlife serv.tce (FWS)
before undertaking projects which entail deepening, impoundments, diversions, or any modification of a stream or other
body of water.
During consultation, FWS recommends practices which
will mitigate fish and wildlife damage during the construction and operation stages of the projects.

25

The Corps is

obligated to give full consideration to the FWS recommelldations.

Hence, for the first time, the Corps is required to

consider additional values besides those embodied in its
original navigation mandate when granting

p~rmits

for coastal

projects.
Memorandum of Understanding, 1967
The FWCA did not satisfactorily facilitate coordination between the FWS and the Corps.

To remedy the situation,

the Secretary of the Army entered into a I>1emorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with the Secretary of Interior.

The

following 2 policies were adopted:
1.

At the earliest practicable time the District
Engineer shall coordinate with the Regional
Directors of the Secretary of the Interior on
Fish and Wildlife, recreation and pollution

20

problems associated with dredging, filling and
excavation operations to be conducted under
permits issued under the 1899 Act in the Naviga-

ble waters of the U.S••.•
2.

If the Secretary of Interior advises that proposed
operations will reasonably impair natural resources
or the related environment including the fish and
wildlife and recreational values thereof, or will
reduce the quality of such waters in violation of
applicable water standards, the Secretary of the
Army ..• wi11 either deny the permit or include
such conditions in the permit as h~ determines to
be in the public interest (emphasis added) ••.• 26
The MOU represents a pivotal point in the expansion

of the Corps responsibilities.

While it recognizes that

the Secretary of the Army retains ultimate responsibility
for decisions on permit applications, the MOU is an official
reminder to the Corps' of its responsibility under the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act to obtain advice from Interior,
regarding impacts from proposed dredge and fill projects.
The MOU, therefore, laid the groundwork for direct negotiation between the two departments.

In addi t.i.on, the MOU re-

quires the Army to deny or modify RHA
not in the best pUblic interest.

per~it

applications

This requirement has been

relied upon time and again in subseauent
court decisions
..
which have drastically

alt~red

the Corps' regulatory juris-

diction.
In response to its commd tmen t.s in the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act and the recent MOU, the Corps promu1gated new regplations governing permits in navigable waters.
The new review criteria ensured that:
The decision as t.o whe1:her a permit will be issued
must rest on an evaluation of all relevant factors,

21
including the effect of the proposed work on navigation, fish and wildlife, conservation, pollution,
aesthetics, ecology and the .general pUbli~ interest. 27
Zabel v. Tabb 28
Soon after the promulgation of the Corps' first publi=
interest regulations, their validity was tested in court.
In Zabel v. Tabb, the court upheld the Corps'
deny lUiA permits on public interest grounds

d~cision

eve~

to

though

the proposed construction would not hinder navigation.

Examin-

ation of this landmark case helps to reveal what the public
interest includes in an actual decision making process.
Zabel and Russel owned land riparian to and underlying, Boca Ciega Bay, Florida, a navigable water of the
u.S.

They applied to the Corps for a permit pursuant to

section 10 of the 1899 Act to dredge and fill eleven acres
of their tideland property for use as a
park.

App~oximately

tion to the project.

con~e~cial

trailer

700 citizens filed comments in opposiThey were joined

by several state

agencies and the u.S. Fish and Wildlife Service which opposed the permit because the proposed dredge and fill activities would harm the fish and wildlife resources of Boca
Ciego Bay.
The District Engineer at Jacksonville, Florida,
Colonel Tabb recommended that the permit be denied although
the proposed work would have no material affect on navigation.
Careful consideration has been given to the general
pUblic interest in this case. The virtual unanimous

22
opposition to the proposed work ••• has convinced me
that approval of the application would not be in
the best pUblic interest. The continued opposition
of the u.s. Fish and Wildlife Service ••• leads me to
the conclusion that approval of the work would not
be consistent with the intent of Congress expressed
in the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, as amended,
12 August 1958. Further the opposition of the State
of Florida and of county authorities •.• gives additional support to my conclusion that the work should
not be 2uthorized.2~ (emphasis added)
Consequently on 28 February 1967, the Secretary of the Army
denied the permit for the following reasons:
1.
2.
3.

4.

It

would result in a distinctly harmful effect
on the fish and wildlife resources in Boca
Ciego Bay;
would be inconsistent with the purposes of
the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of
1958, as amended (16 U.S.C. 662);
is opposed by the Florida Board of Conservation on behalf of the State of Florida,
and by the county Health Board of Pinellas
County and the Board of County Commissioners
of Pinellas County; and
would be contrary to pUblic interest (emphasis
added) .30
The developers then sued for an injunction to compel

the Distric": Engineer to issue the permit.

At trial, the

Corps contended that section 10 of the 1899 Act should be
understood in conjunction "ith the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, thereby giving the Corps discretionary authority
to deny an application for a dredge and fill permit despite
no impact to navigation.

~~he

Federal District Court disagreed

· 31
an d or d ere d t h e Corps to grant t h e perm1t.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fiftp
Circuit reversed, holding that the Secretary of Army could
refuse to authorize dredge and fill projects in navigable

23
waters for factually substantial ecological reasons even
though the project would not interfere with navigation,
flood control or the production of power.

First, the court

cited the RHA in determining that factors other than navigation could be considered.
The Act itself does not put any restrictions
on denial of a permit or the reasons why the Secretary
may refuse to grant a permit to one seeking to build
structures on or dredge and fill his own property.
Al though the Ac:t has always been read as tempering
the outright prohibition by the rule of reason
against arbitrary action, the Act does flatly forbid
the obstruction. The administrator may grant permission on conditions and conversely deny permission
when the situation does not allow for those conditions.
But the statute does not prescribe either
generally or specifically what those conditions
-may be. The question for us is whether under the
Act the Secretary may include conservation considerations as conditions to be met to make the proposed
project acceptable. Until now there has been no
absolute answer to this question.
In fact, in most
cases under the Rivers and Harbors Act the Courts
have been facec only with navigational probl¢ms. 3 2
The court enphasized that the Corps no longer has to"wear
navigational blinders" when it considers a permit request.
Second, the court cited the commerce clause, Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act and the National Environmental
Policy Act to buttress its position.

The court further

held that Congress has the power to protect wildlife in
navigable waters and accordingly regulate the use of private
property for this reason.

Congress, however, must be

reasonably sure that the activity regulated has' a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.

33

The court concluded that

destruction of fish and wildlife in estuarine waters has a
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substantial, even devastating, effect on interstate commerce.
Judge Brown used the 1egielative history of the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act to illustrate its applicability.
He concluded that the Coordination Act requires the Corps
to take Fish and Wildlife resources into account in the
decision making process.

Furthermore, the court cited the

retroactive application of NEPA holding that NEPA requires
eve~y

federal agency to ccnsider ecological factors when

reviewing activities which have an impact on the human environment.

Thus, the Court agreed with the Corps, holding that

consideration of the natural resource factors of the pUblic
interest was part of the Corps' responsibility in determining
whether or not to grant permits. 34 The 1968 public interest
regulations promulgated by the Corps were instrumental in
this decision.
National Environmental Policy AGt

35

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was
the Congressional response to increasing pollution problems
and the resulting environmental degradation.

Through the

Act, Congress attempted to Lncorporace er.'.vironmenta1 considerations into fedelra1 agency decision mc;;.king processes.

By

requiring En',ironmemta1 Impact Statements (EIS) for all major
actions significant:1y affecting the environment, NEPA forces
federal agencies to take a hard look at impacts resulting
from their projects.
The Act declares a national policy,
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••• which will encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere3ind to stimulate the health and
welfare of man ••••
To ensure adherance to this goal, NEPA directs, to the fullest extent possible, the federal government to interpret
other policies, regulations and public laws in accordance
with those policies set forth in the Act.

Hence, the Corps

must adhere to NEPA when considering whether or not to grant
permits for coastal alteration constituting a major federal
action.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act 3 ?
The objective of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA) is to restore and maintain the natural chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters.
The Act requires the discharge of pollutants to be eliminated
by 1985.

The principal mechanism

establi~hed

for achieving

this goal is the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) which requires the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPAl to regulate the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters.
The inclusion of dredged material within the definition of pollutant:s created a potential overlap between the
new NPDES and Corps' traditional

jur~sdiction

under the RHA.

Congress, however, avoided this overlap by including section
404.

The new secti.on authorized the Secretary of the Army,

acting through the Corps of Engineers, to regulate discharges
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Although section 404 prevented EPA from taking over
the Corpsl permit authorities, ultimately the Agency had
great impact on the program.

EPA contended that the federal

jurisdiction under the 1912 amendments extended to all waters
capable of affecting commerce regardless of whether

navi~

gability could be established under traditional legal tests.
To support its position, EPA reminded the Chief of the Corps
of the jurisdictional milestone established in

u.s.

v.

Holland~

In this case, the U.8. sought to enjoin land filling operations in mangrove swamps and mosquito canals.

The court

restricted its consideration to the FWPCA and to whether
Congress intended the Act to cover pollution in non-navigable mosquito canals and wetlands.
The Court reviewed the legislative history of the
FWPCA and determined that Congress had Lrrt.erided to control
the discharg$ of pollutants at the source.
case, the source of pollution was the

In the Holland

la~d-filling

tions in non-navigable mosquito ce.naLs ,

opera-

The Court concluded

that in order to control this pollution and implement Congressional intent, the old navigability restriction had to
be removed.

Consequently, i. t ir:J.tarp.r-eted the FWPCA to include

"all bodies including mainstreams and their tributaries.,,40
Corps jurisdiction would no longer be restricted to navigable
waters pursuant to the power under the commerce clause, but
would be increased to encompass all waters.
While the Corps willingly agreed that the FWPCA
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required it to regulate the filling of

wetland,~, it

was

adamently opposed to the Extension of its licensing authority
beyond the boundaries of navigable waters defined by the
commerce power.

The Corps explained in a press release its

extreme reluctance to expand its jurisdiction.
Under some of the proposed regulations, federal
permits may be required by the rancher who wants
to enlarge his stock pond, or the farmer who wants
to deepen an irrigation ditch, or .the mountaineer
who wants to p~otect his land against stream erosicn. 4l
Furthermore, the Corps interpreted legislative history and
insisted that EPA had regulatory responsibility for dredge
and fill projects outside of traditional navigable waters.
In accordance with its position, the Corps' 1974 revised
..

regulations maintained the preexisting jurisdictional limi42
tations.
This resistance was successfully challenged in
NRDC, Inc. v. Calloway 43 when the federal court for the
Dis':rict of Columbia ordered the Corps to amend its jurisdiction uncer section 404 of the FWPCA to include all waters
of the U.S., not merely navigational waters.
The Ho1.lcm:1and

Callaway~da.cisions

polation of Congressional intent.

represent an extra-

The legislative history

of section 404 indicates t.hat Congress was primarily concerned
wi th the disposal of pol l.c.t.ed dredge spoils.

Destruction

of wetlands by these activities was not specifically addressed. 44
In both cases, however, the courts relied upon the purpose
of the FWPCA to justify a literal reading of section 404 •
••• subsection tcl provides for careful consideration
of whether or not such discharges will have 'unacceptable adverse effect on municip~l wat7r suppli 7s,
shellfish beds and fishery areas (1nclud1ng spawn1ng
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and breeding areas}, wildlife or recJ:eational areas.
~hese three 'sections do not by themselves prove
conclusively that Congress sought to assume jurisdiction over activities taking place in wetlands
above the mean high water line. What these sections
do reveal is a sensitivity to the value of coastal
breeding ground •••
••• the FWPCA embodies the realization that pollution
of these areas may be ecologically fatal.
In an attempt to combat these threats to the
coastal enviror~ent, the Congress broadened its
jurisdiction to encompass 'all waters of the United
States. In doing so Congress deemed it e~sential
that the discharge of pollutants be controlled at
the source. I Legislative History Vol. 2, p. 1495 •• ~.
One of the sources of pollution ••• (is) the discharge
of sand, dirt and dredged spoil on land, although
above the mean high water line (is) periodically
inundated. 45
The Holland and Calloway decisions effectively designated
the .Corps as "guardian of the nat.Lon ' s wetlands". 46
While the previous discussion does not have direct
bearing on the evolution of public review

crit~ria,

it is,

nevertheless, important to note for two reasons:
First, it represents another instance where the Corps·
juri.sdiction was greatly expanded: this time to include
regulation of dredge and fill ac t LvI ties in all wetlands.
The Court decisions and jurisdictional alterations clearly
demonstrate a judicial desire to conserve valuable wetlands
and to reflect these concerns inthe decision making process.
Second, in response to court interpretations, the Corps promulgated regulations to include wetlands, along with public
interest review crit.eria, in its general policies for evaluating permit applications.
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1977 Clean Water Act 47
In adopting the 1977 amendments to the FWPCA, Congress
made a number of major changes
gram.

in~e

dredge and fill pro-

Most importantly, Congress retained the broad juris-

dictional approach

advocat~d

by both EPA and the courts in
regulating the discharges of dredge and fill material. 48

However, Congress allowed states, with federally approved
dredge and fill

per~it

programs, to take over permit res-

ponsibi1ity for waters within state jurisdiction (those
waters, traditionally non-navigable and above the mean
high water mark) thereby releasing the Corps from its
unwanted responsibility outside of navigable waters pursuant
49
t o th e' power un d er th e commerce clause.
The 1977 amendments did little to affect the public
interest review, therefore, no further discussion will be
devoted to the Act as amended.
of significant
program.

even~s

Table 1 providep
a summary
,
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TABLE 1
Significant EventR in the Corps' Coastal Regulatory Program

Year

Legislation

1802

Congressional Act creating
the Corps

1877

Dolph Bill proposed to
protect harbors from random development

Regulation

l88ij

Williamette Iron Bridge Co. v.
Hatch provides impetus to enact the Dolph Bill

1890

First Rivers and Harbors
Act

1896

Proposed revisions to the
Rivers and Harbors Act

1899

Rivers and Harbors Act
..,
requires Corps to maintain
navigation free from ub- I
struction

1940

Court Case

•
U.S. v. Appalachian Electric
Power Co. expands the navigability definition to be as
broad as the needs of commerce

w
o

(

(

(

TABLE 1 -- continued

Year
1958

Legislation

Regulation

Court Case

Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act requires the Corps
to consult with FWS

u.s.

1960

v~__~~~blic

Steel
expands the term
refuse to include
industrial pollution

~.

1968
1969

First public interest regulations promulgated
National Environmental
Policy Act requires the .Corps.
to file environmental impact statements for coastal
alteration constituting a
major federal action

1970

1972

w
....

IFederal Water Pollution
Control Act authorizes the
Corps to regulate dredge
and fill activities in u.s.
waters

abel v. Tabb allows
orps to deny permits
for factually subs tan~ia1 ecological reasons
ven though the project
ou1d not interfere
ith navigation

~

I

(

(

(

TABLE 1 -- continued

Year

Legislation

Reguiation

Court Case

u.s.

1974

v. Holland removes
the old navigability
restriction and interprets FWPCA to include
all bodies of water

1975

NRDC, Inc. v. Calloway
requires Corps to amend
its jurisdiction to include all bodies of
water

1976

1977

I Clean Water Act upholds
the broad jurisdictional
approach

w
I\,)
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Permit Process Structure

An examination of the current permit processing
structure and the pUblic interest review will conclude the
chronological history of the Corps' jurisdictional expansion in the coastal zone.
The Corps is broken down into 36 different district
offices each commanded by a

colon~l.

The colonel of each

district is responsible to one of the eleven division commanjers, usually a brigadier or major general.

In turn,

the division commanders report to the Chief of the Corps,
who is ultimately responsible to the Secretary of the Army.
Applicants wishing to dredge or fill must apply to
the appropriate District Engineer having jurisdiction over
waters in which the activity is pxoposed ,

The contents of

the application must include a cmlplete description of the
proposed activity including the necessary approvals required

bY

0

50
.
1 state an d 1oca 1 agenc1es.
ther F e d era,
In addition, the applicant must include a thorough

description of the type, composition and quantity of the
material to be dreeged as well as disposal plan.

Additional

information deemed necessary by the District Engineer to
evaluate the application must also be suPPlied.
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The

District Engineer then issues a public notice describing
the project and stating criteria for evaluation.

After

considering all the public comments, he determines whether
or not an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) will be
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required.

An EIS must be prepared if the District Engineer

believes that a permit may be warranted but that the proposed activity would significantly affect the quality of
the human environment.
As required by NEPA, the EIS must contain the
following information:
ervironme~ta1

impact of the proposed

~ctivity;

1.

the

2.

any adverse unavoidable effects;

3.

alternatives to the proposed action r

4.

relationship between the local short term use of
man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement
of long term productivity;

5.

any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources. 5 2
The District Engineer makes the

initia~

decision to

grant or deny the permit based on the recommendations from
his multi-disciplinary staff which includes lawyers, bio10gists and recreational specialists.

Based on the criteria

which the Ccrps must evaluate with each application and
provided no unresolved substantive objections arise, the
District Engineer may grant the permit.
however, are

referrE~d

at the division level,

Controversial Gases,

to the next h Lez axch Lca L level.
objec~ions

If,

from another federal agency

remain unresolved, or when the recommended decision is contrary to the stated position of the governor of the state,
.
53
the case is forwarded to the Chief 0 f t h e Eng1neers.
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Denial of the permit by the Corps is authorized
when:
1.

the state prohibits certification under Section 401
of the FWPCAi 54

2.

the proposed work will excessively interfere with
navigation pursuant to sections 9 and 10 of the RHAi

3.

the permit is determined tQ be contrary to the pUblic
interest. 55
Public Interest Review
Within the Corps' regulations, under the heading

"General Policies for Evaluating Permit Applications", the
public interest review is the first policy discussed.
The policy requires the Corps to base its decisions to grant
or deny pe::11lits on an "evaluation of the

probabl~

impact of

the proposed activity and its intended use on the public
56
interest."
In order to accomplish this, the Corps must,
first,

dis~:inguish

the public int:arest fflctors specific to

each partieular proposal.

Second, the benefits to the public

interest relsulting from the proposed activity must be balanced
against the reasonable forseeable detriments to public
interest.

For exa::nple, consider a proposal which calls for

alteration of a natural beach to facilitate energy production.

~~he

project will obviously have different effects

on two fact.ors of the public interest.

It will have nega-

tive impacts on recreational opportunity while simultaneously
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enhancing energy production.

The decision to authorize,

deny or modify the project will result from the general
balancing process required by the regulations.
All factors which_may be considered relevant to the
proposal must be considered; among those are conservation, economics,~~hetics, general environmental
concerns, historic values, fish and wildlife values,
flood d::unage prevention, land use, navigation, recreation, water supply, water quality, energy needs,
safe food production, and, in general, the needs and
welfare of the people. No permit will be granted unless its issuance is found to be in the public interest.
The following general criteria will be considered in the evaluation of every application:
(i)
the relative extent of the pUblic and private need for the proposed structure or work;
(ii)
the desirability of using appropriate alternative locations and methods to accomplish
the objective of the proposed structure or
work;
(iii)
the extent and permanence of the beneficial
and/or detrimental effects which the proposed
structure or work may have on the public and
private uses to which an area is suited; and
(Lv)
the probably impact of each proposal in relation
to the cumulative effect created by other
eXisting and anticip~ged structures or work
in the general area.
Discussion
A simple examination of the pUblic interest regulations reveals their broad focus and leaves the evaluation
with many substantive procedural questions.
review applied in actual cases?

How is the

How does the Corps strike a

balance between opposing factors of public interest?

How

comprehensive are the regulations and what is the extent
of their scope?

While it is impossible to thoroughly dis-

cuss all questions raised 'lithin the bounds of this study,
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those most relevant: to the study I s purpoe.e will be addressed.
First, however, the following examples will be presented in
order to delineate both the meaning and applicability of
the public interest review.
Two Implementation Examples
Marc:o Island
The Marco Island project helps to
definition of public interest.

ill~strate

the Corp's

It also helps to discern

the relationship between the process involved in determining
whether or not to grant permits and the factors of pUblic
interest.
In 1973, the Deltona Corporation applied to the Corps
for section 10 RHA and section 404 fWPCA permits to dredge
18.2 million cubic yards from navigable waters around Marco
Island and to deposit the material in
acres of mangrove wetlands.

approxi~ately

2100

The permits would enable Deltona

to complete the final phase of its Marco

Isla~d

master plan

by providing single family housing for 35,000 individuals.
Phase 1 of the plan began in 1964 after the Corps issued
the necessary permits.

In 1967, when construction of the first

phase was nearly complete, Deltona applied for permits to
begin phase 2 of the development scheme.

The FWS, however,

objected to the second phase permits.

Although a two year
59
delay ensued, the permits were ultimately granted.
By
the time Deltona was ready to

begi~

the final 3 phases of

construction (1973) and applied for sections 10 and 404
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permits, the new regulations and legislation previously discussed were in full effect.

The Corps was, therefore,

obligated to scrutinize the permits very closely and determine whether or net the best public interest would be served
by granting them.

The permit applications proved to be

qui te controversial.

In favor of the permi t~

loIlere

the Oepart-·

ment of Labor and the Board of County Commissioners, Hendry
County.

Opposition came from 2,300 correspondents, not

to mention 31 petitions, the State Game and Fresh Water
Fish Commission, National Marine Fisheries Service, FWS,
National Park Service, EPA, Town of Longboat Key, City of
Sanibel and City of Naples.

The controversy was exacer-

bated by the Deltona Corporation which continued to sell
lots despite the fact that the permits had net yet been
granted.
The EIS listed the following

neg~tive

impacts which

would result from the issuance of the perma ts.
1.

destruction of approximately 2,200 acres of

2.

short: terms water quality degradation from dredge and

mangroves~

fill operations as we Ll, as long term impacts resulting
from urbanization.
3.

commercial sport fishing reductions due to habitat loss
~
o f tIre

.
pr~a~y

In April of 1976,

~:he

f 00d

°
60
c h a1n.

Chief of the Engineers authorized the

Jacksonville district to issue permits for one of the three
sections but to deny the other two.

The reasons, listed as

factors of pUblic interest in the Corps' report, are as
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follows:
1.

2.

Corps Wetlands Policy - In determining whether
a particular alteration is necessary~ our regulations require that we determine if the
activity is dependent upon wetland resources
and whether feasible alternate sites exist.
EPA Guidlines - The permits failed the test of
the EPA Guidlines, 404(b) which state that
destruction of aquatic resources by filling
operations in wetlands is consider~d the most
severe environmental impact covered. The Corps
responded by pointing out that rec~eational
housing does not require a location in wetlands.
While a derived benefit of such ho~~ing may be
an opportunity to recreate in or near the water
resource, the basic purpose of6it i~ still
the same: to provide shelter.
The Corps thoroughly incorporated the public interest

review mandate into the Marco Island decision making process
and in so doing, provided insight into how the general
criteria are used to evaluate the public interest.

The

following discussion will briefly reiterate factors in the
Corps decision and show how they were evaluated using the
pUb?;.ic interest review criteria.
1.

the relative extent of the public and private need for
the proposed structure:
Although the majority of the responses received
by the Corps opposed the pr()posal, those whom Deltona
had already Bold lots to were strongly in favor.
Letters were received from as far away as Wisconsin
pleadipg for the permits to be granted.

Most of these

individuals had planned to retire on Marco Island and
the health of some depended on the warm climate.

They

felt they represented a legitimate need for the project.
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While the Corps recognized these cbmpelling arguments,
it determined that benefits which would be received
by a small portion Of the private sector did not

warrant the widespread destruction of wetlands and
fish and wildlife resources.
2.

desirability of using appropriate alternative locations
and nethods to accomplish the objective of the proposed work:
Alternative locations for the proposed project
were available within the country.

Furt~ermore,

housing, recreational or otherwise, serves the same
basic function - to provide shelter.

The Corps

determined that shelter does not require a wetlands
location.
3.

the extent and permanence of the bene f LcLaL and/or
detrimental effects which the proposed structure
would have on pUblic and private U8es to which the
area is suited:
Detrimental impacts Lnc Iudec, the permanent loss
of 21\)0 ac res of productive wetlands, p.robab Ly longterm

~ecline

of fish and wildlife resources dependent

upon ene wetlands, and water quality degradation.
Housing for 35,000 constituted the beneficial impacts.
The land area, however, was not particularly well
suited for this purpose.

4.

the p+obable impact of each proposal in relation to
the cumulative impacts:
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The proposal would remove .5 percent of Florida's
mangrove wetlands.

The mangroves in question serve im-

portant biological functions (including food chain
production, general habitat, spawning, rearing and
resting sites for aquatic and land species).

In

addition, wetlands act as sanctuaries and significantly shield other areas from wave action, erosion
or storm damage.

Destruction of 2100 acres of these

valuable wetlands would constitute an impact with
unmeasurable ramifications.
Block "M"
In 1973, the Block "M" Corporation applied for a 404
dredge and fill permit in the Gulf of Mexico near Hudson,
Floriday.

The application requested permission to dredge

170,000 cubic yards and to fill
conc.ominium housing development.

a~d

bulkheard 12 acres for a

Objections rai.sed by

~,

FWS and local residents were based on:

1.

environmental grounds;

2.

the effects of a condominium in a small community;

3.

six fold expansion of a sewage treatment plant where
there was really no area in which to expand.
TeD
h
i rector

0

f

'I Work s, MaJor
' Genera 1

'
C~v~

62

. 63

Morr~s

denied the permits stating:
We have reviewed this permit file in conjunction
with the Corps policy on the protection of wetlands
which was promulgated and published in the Federal
Register on 3 April 1974. The policy now requires,
as a matter of law, that unless the public interest
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requires otherwise, permit applications for activities
in valuable wetlands must be denied unless it can
be concluded that the benefits of the proposed
wetlands alteration will outweigh the damage to the
wetlands resource and that the proposed alteration
is necessary to realize those benefits ••••
(T)he applicant has failed to establish that the
siting of this proposed housing development at
this wetlands location is dependent on this wetlands
resource. In addition, the applicant has failed to .
establish that there are no other feasible alternative
sites for multi-family housin·:J of this type in this
area. Accordingly, we have been unable to conclude
from the record that this proposed activity is a necessary
alteration of this wetlands resource. [Emphasis added]64
The Block "M" Case also demonstrates the importance
placed on wetlands as a pUblic interest value.

Although

the amount of proposed alteration was considerably less
than in the Marco Island example, the preservation of 12
acres of wetlands was deemed to be more in the pUblic
interest than condominium housing.

From both examples, it

can be concluded that alteration 0f highly productive wetlands for housing development is no t, in the public interest.
The justification for wetlands preservation in these cases
focused on the direct and indirect impacts to fishery
resources, Corps and EPA regulations.
Neither case, however, forced the Corps to confront
more difficult pUblic interest issues.

Such issues include

Corps review of projects which indirectly but substantially
impact fisheries without alteration of productive wetlands.
For example, a housing development, sewage treatment plant,
or oil refinery may require Corps' dredge and fill permits
even though no wetlands alteration will occur.

These pro-

jects may cause real harm to local fisheries from sewage
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discharge, refinery effluent or oil spills.

Public interest

regulations do not provide clearly defined standards
which express how much emphasis should be given to more
important but secondary impacts in a decision making
process.

The public interest review also fails to provide

mechanisms to balance opposing factors of public interest
within a given

proj~ct.

Without the clear

gui~ance

of

the Corps' wetlands mandate, the public interest review may
be much more difficult to apply.
Surranary
Discussion thus far has focused on the role of the
Corps 'in coastal alteration decision making processes.
Judicial interpretations and current legislation have
successively broadened the Corps' permit jurisdiction tc
reflect public interest values alien to its navigational
mandate.

Regardless of the applicability of the commerce

power, the Corps now has the authority to deny permits
which are not deemed to be in the best public interest.
The determination of the public interest is also intricately linked with other requirements found in the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act and with Department of
Interior.

Hence, in evaluating applications for section

10 and section 404 permits, the Corps must consider an
incredible amount of input and public interest factors
in order to make a well balanced decision.
The next part of this study will examine how the

44
Corps implemented its public interest review in the Hampton
Roads refinery example.

CHAPTER IV
HAMPTON ROADS REFINERY
Refinery Complex and Chesapeake Bay Resources
Refinery Complex
The Hampton Roads Energy Company (HREC) in March,
1975,app1ied for Department of Army permits for proposed
construction of a refinery and marine terminal.

The

refinery, initially designed to process 175,000 barrels of
crude oil per day would eventually be expanded to produce
a

co~bined

total of more than seven million gallons of low

sulfur gasoline, jet fuel, butane, propane and other re1ated products per day.

Typical Middle East crude would

be used as a feed stock.
The marine terminal would 'oe capab Le of handling
two 85,000 dead weight tons (DWT) tankers for incoming
crude and two small tankers or barges for outgoing products
simultaneously.

An oil spill containment system is to be

permanently installed to

co~p1ete1y

surround each tanker or

barge prior to loadings and un10adings.
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The mooring area and access channel will be dredged
to accomodate the refinery complex.

The 3.4 million cubic

yards of dredge material would be deposited in the nearby
Craney Island Disposal Area.
The project would employ an extensive wastewater
45
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treatment Bystem which captures rainwater draining from all
parts of the site in order to remove pet't'oleum products and
other contaminants.

The treated wastewater would then be
discharged into the Elizabeth River. 66
Since a portion of the complex work will affect
navigable ",aters, Department of A'":my permits pursuant t.o
section 10 of the River and Harbors Act and section 404
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act are required.
This work includes:

(1) construction of marine terminals,

(2) dredging of the tanker and barge mooring areas and

access channels, and (3) installation of an oil spill containment system. 67
In addition to the Department of Army permits, EPA
and three state agencies have permitting authority for the
construction and operating phases of the complex.

The

agencies ar..d their authorities are listed in Ta.ble 2.
\

(

(

(

TABLE 2
Non Army Permits

Agency

Permit

Purpose

Environmental Protection
Agency, EPA

Prevention of Significant Air
Quality Deterioration, PSD

Regulates sulfuroxide and
particulate emissions

State Air Pollution Control
Board, SAPCB

New industrial source

Construction and operation
of certain new sources of
air pollution emissions.
Must comply with EPA National Ambient Air Quality
Standards, (NAAQ5)

State Water Control Board,
SWCB

Virginia Marine Resources
Commission, VMRC

Certificate of Compliance

Ensures that proposed
dredging and construction
activities comply with
water quality standards
and Virginia Water Control
laws

National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System, NPDES

Regulates discharge of
pollutants into water from
a point source

Dredge and fill

Regulates construction of
piers, docks and other activities in state waters

SOURCE: OASA (CW), "Evaluation of the HRECo Permit Case -- A
Proposed Refinery and Terminal Complex to be constructed in Portsmouth, Virginia," 1979, p.8.

,;:.
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While the state permit process complicated the Corps'
permit review and increased delay, the rEal

so~rce

of de-

lay resulted from unresolved objections, particularly from
the Department of Interior.

Most of these objections arose

out of concern for the commercial and recreational fishery
resources of the Chesapeake.

Accordingly a brief overview

of the Chesapeake's resources is warranted.
The Chesapeake Bay - A Unique Resource
The Chesapeake Bay is the largest estuary in the
United States and one of the most productive in the world.
The lower bay and its associated estuaries provide essential spawning, nursery and feeding grounds for most of the
bay's commercial and recreational species.

Of primary
value are oysters, blue crabs, finfish and waterfowl. 68
The oyster and bluecrab industries not only contribute
to the local economies but have national importance as well.
The Bay produces 40 percent of the total U.S. harvest of
oysters and at least 50 percent of the nation's harvest of
cluecarbs.

In 1977, these harvests amounted to 17 and 60

million pounds bringing a retail value of $48 and $39 million
respectively. 69

The major populations of both organisms are

located within close proximity to either the proposed refinery
or navigation channels to the refinery.

Figures 4 and 5

diagram the position of the lucrative oyster beds and reveals
their proximity to the refinery.
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(Norfolk, Virginia), 1 March 1979, p.12.
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The beds, which supply at least 75 percent of all
seed oysters transplanted to other growing

ar~as

in Virginia

and neighboring states, are considered by the Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences (VIMS) to be unique and irrep1aceab1eo
Likewise, the b1uecrab over wintering grounds
the Hampton Roads

~arbor

sidered to be peer1ess. 70

~ear

approach channels are also conSee Figure 6 for the locaticn of

the b1uecrc.b spawning areas.
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SOURCE: National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, Position
Statement on the Siting of an Oil Refinery by the Hampton Roads Energy Company at
Portsmouth, Virginia, December, 1978, p.27.
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Widespread throughout the Chesapeake Bay are saline,
brackish and freshwater wetlands.

Such wetlands form the

primary basis for the high natural productivity for which
the Bay is famous.

Oysters and bluecrabs as well as finfish

inhabi ting the bay depend directly or indirect.ly on the wetlands for their food source.

In addition, wetlands provide

habitat for' invertebrates, fish, birds and mammals; buffer
the effects of storm generated waves by stabilizing the
shoreline; and function as natural fillers for the removal
71 72
of pollutants. '
The Bay's value as.a recreational resource should not
go unnoticed.

Recreational use of the lower Chesapeake Bay

and Hampton Roads area is intensive.
"beaching", boating and fishing.

Activities include

While no figures are readily

available for Virginia, in 1977 the Maryland

D~partment

of

Natural Resources estimated the economic impact of recreational boating on the state economy as a lrpos
, t; $370 million a
73
year.
Recreational fishing is a particularly important Bay
dependent industry.

Its value, well over $100 million annually
is equal to that of the commercial fishery catch. 74
Concern has been expressed by several federal agencies
along with VrMS that oil spills resulting from refinery stimulated tanker and barge traffic could cause harm to the
Chesapeake's valuable resources.
if any, however is unknown.

The extent of this damage,

Refinery opponents argued that

the risk posed by the refinery to these resources would be
too great implying that the industry and fisheries are

54
mutually exclusive.

\--

In addition, they cited other public

interest factors which they believed were sufficient to
warrant permit denial.

However refinery advocates also

cited various public interest considerations which supported
their position.

The following discussion delineates the

conflict of interests.
Conflict of Interest
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Refinery Proponents
National Need
Proponents of the refinery, notably the Departments
of Energy, Treasury and Defense along with the city of
Portsmouth and business organizations, cited three public
interest benefits which would result from the project.
1.

The decrease in outflow of

U.s.

oil suppliers would be the

?rincip~l

dollars to foreign

refinery to the national economy.

benefit of domestic

A net national

saving would be derived from the difference between
the high price per barrel of imported products and
the comparatively lower price of imported crude.
2.

Department of Energy statistics show that 86 percent
of all refined products imported to the

U.s.

come to

the East Coast, which at present, has a refinery
capacity capable of satisfying only 23 percentt of the
product

dema~d.

Half of the remaining supply needed

cames fram the Gulf Coast refineries and the remaining
25 percent from imports.

The East Coast, therefore,
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pays between $.60 - $1.00 more per barrel than the
costs of similar products on the GUlf.
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A major

East Coast refinery would help to equalize the cost
differential and therefore constitute a savings.
Increased refining capacity would also ease excessive hardships to the East Coast in times of supply
interruption.
3.

The new refinery would enhance the national security by adding storage facilities to the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve (SPR).

The SPR functions as a

supply source for the country during times of supply
interruptions or embargoes.
Local Benefits
The Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)
emphasized the value of the refinery to the local economy
as a secondary benefit.

The construction phase would

provide employment for 3,030 different workers with estimated earnings of about $50 million.
marine terminal would

perm~nently

The refinery and

employ approximately 500

individuals totalling an a::mual payroll of $ 7 , 500 ,00.

An

estimated 500 supporting jobs are also expected to result
from the project.

The refinery will generate approximately

$5 million annually in tax revenues, $3 million of which
will go to the city of portsmouth.??
State-of-the-Art-Technology
Proponents argued that the pollution control tech-
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nology utilized by HREC would prevent excessive degradation
of air and water quality.

They disputed clau1s that the

refinery would cause irreparable harm to the Bay's living
resources or fishing industries.

Supporters note, in parti-

culcir, the sophisticated oil spill containment system and
waste processing facility.

The q6ntainment system which

surrounds each vessel is also equipped with booms and barriers
to corral any oil escaping the primary system.

Portable

skimmers will be employed to remove spilled oil from the
water surface.

These pollution control measures prompted

the Virginia Institute of Marine Science (VIMS) to conclude
that spills occuring within the compounds of the marine terminal would be of minor concern.
Initially, HREC proposed to have its sewage processed
in a nearby sewage treatment plant (STP).

VIMB, however

expressed considerable concern over the proposed use of a
municipal STP to process refinery wastes for

~wo

reasons.

First, STP's are ill-equipped to treat refinery wastes; and
second, the resultant effluent would be discharged upstream
from the James River oyster beds.

In response to criticism,

HREC revised its proposal to include on site construction of
a processing plant designed specifically for refinery wastes.
Effluent monitoring would be conducted by HREC to ensure that
79
effluent stays b e 1 ow accepta bl e trea tmen t levels.
In addition, the refinery will be engineered to employ
the current state-of-the-art air quality equipment in order to
minimize emission leaks to the atmosphere.

80
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Refinery Opponents
Despite the benefits cited by the proponents and the
pollution control technol,)gy employed, there was wides?read
opposition to the refinery.

Federal resistance was led by

001, NOAA, and EPA, while CARE and the Oyster Packers and
Planters Association spearheaded the local resistance.
Table 3 provides an overview of the state's political
sentiment.
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TABLE 3
Political Support

Political Officers

Representative Daniel
Representative Trible
Representative Whitehurst
Senator Byrd
Senator Warren
Governor Dalton

Pro

Con

X
X
X

No position
No position
X

SOURCE: OASA(CW), "Evalutation of the HRECo Permit
Case ~- A Proposed Refinery and Terminal Complex to be
Constructed in Portsmouth, Virginia", p.94.
National Need
According to opponents, the national need for increased U.S. refining capacity is speculative.
1979 GAO report entitled "'I'he

u.s ,

The June

Refining Capacity in a

Changing World Oil Environment," suggests that, due to the
insecurity of foreign crude supplies, federal pqlicies
affecting oil investments would best be directeq to expansion
of domestic suppliers rather than construction of new refinery capacity.8l

Since the HREC refinery will be dependent

upon the Middle East for its source of crude supply, opponents argue that the refinery will be subject to political
supply disruptions.
Moreover, the u.S. refining capacity has decreased
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over the years.

In 1930., more than 600 refineries were

operating in this country while in 1975 only 275 were still
producing. 82

Growth, averaging about 5 percent per year,

has been attributed almost entirely to additions in existing
refinery capacity.

In addition, GAO and other authorities

pradict a decline in gas consumption by 19B5 due to automobile miieage requirements. B3

Hence, the chairman of the

Old Dominion University Economics Department concluded
that reactivation of an old refinery would be wiser than construction of the HREC complex.

While concurring with the

cost of transportation argument, the chairman contended that
harm to the multi-million dollar commercial fishing industry
. k 1 y 1rra
.
d 1cate
.
.
84
cou" ld qU1C
t h ose sav1ngs.
Local Need
The addition of 500 jobs is a tiny portion of the
Po~tsmouth

40,000 member labor force.

Most of the jobs

will require advanced levels of skill and technical abilities,
much of which will not be available locally.

Consequently,

the HREC facility will not become a panacea for the city's
hardcore unemployment problem.

While additional revenue

may well indeed boost Portsmouth's financial status, in the
long run this may be questionable.

Middle to upper class

residents, directlY. affected by deteriorating air and water
quality, may move to the suburbs to escape the inconvenience
and the loss in property value.

The establishment of a petro-

chemical plant could discourage high income brackets from
.

~.

remaining in or returning to the city •
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The negative externalities were not calculated in the
cost/benefit analysis nor were the spi.llover costs to surrounding cities estimated.
Air Quality and Health
The refinery emissions would consist
hydrocarbons, sulfur, and nitrous oxides.

p~imarily

of

Hydrocarbon

emissions react synergistically wi.th othE'ir elements in the
atmosphere to form photochemical oxidants.

Photochemical

oxidant concentrations in the Hampton Roads area already
violate the National Ambient Air quality Standards.
carbon emissions also pose health hazards.

Hydro-

Many local

physicians objected to the refinery because of the correlation between petroleum manufacturing industries

~nd

the

amounts of lung, nasal and skin cancer.
Underestimation of the Likelihood of Spills
Hampton Roads is a major port of entry, as well as a
center for one of the world's largest Naval operation.
Approximately 79,000 vessels moved through this port annually
between 1970 and 1973.

(The number of U.S. naval vessel

movements are· not available for security reasons.)

Con-

struction of the proposed refinery would result in a substantial increase in both number of vessel movement and the
volume of petroleum transported through the area.
The facility will require an annual average of 798
barges and 123 tankers loadings to deliver refined products
within the Bay and along the East Coast.

The FElS estimates

an increase of 2.1 to 2.6 percent in total vessel movement
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and 22.5 - 33.5 percent increase in oil tanker and barge
traffic within the Hampton Roads area. 8=

Most of the

finished products will be transported by barges which have a
fairly high aoc Ldent; rate in Chesapeake Bay. 86

NOAA com-

missioned Engineering Computer optecnomics, Inc. (ECO) to
study the traffic patterns and spill
Bay witn and without a refinery.

pro~abilities

in the

The ECO report projeqted

an average oil spill of 1,290 barrels every eight years from
barges associated with the facility and an average spill of
7,710 barrels every 9.2 years from tankers.

A catastrophic
spill is predicted to occur once in 50 years. 87 ECO found
that accident rates of large tankers which will service the

retinery, to be greater than 9 times what is presently
servicing the Hampton Roads port.
accident rate statistics show a

Furthermore, worldwide

n~arly

3

fold increase over

the world average in tanker casualties wi.thin Hampton Roads. 88
001 has advised that the t::hesapeake Bay is already

stressed by the cumulative effects of nearly 800 petroleum
spills per year and that every increasing oil transportation
on the Bay is incompatible with the continued health and
survival of the unique and irreplaceable fish and wildlife
resources.
Tanker and barge movements in and out of
this region would create spills of crude oil
and of refinery products. Of that we may be
certain, for there are no foolproof systems to
avoid them. We need not get into a numbers game
about probabilities; it is enough to say that there
would be damage, and that it would continue, and
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that some of it would be cumulative and could not
be reversed. 89
Allegations have been made by NOAA and others that
the probability of spills has been severely underestimated.
Besides the enhanced risks of spills from increased vessel
traffic, concern has been expressed over the ability of the
Coast Guard to reduce the occurance of spills.
the Bay region

Already,

has suffered from too many uncontained spills

which continually jeopardize the shellfish industry.90
The Maryland Water Resources Board has registered numerous
complaints about the Coast Guard's apparent inability or
unwillingness to take immediate action to contain and clean
up spills. 9l This problem, in part, may be att~ibuted to
the scant manpower the Coast Guard could summon to arrest a
spill before it got

out of hand as well as the primitive
state-of-the-art oil spill containment systems. 92 The re-

mainder of the problem rests with the inability of Coast
Guard regulations to alleviate human error, the cause of so
many

'd en t s. 93

acc~

Underestimation of Spill Impacts
National Marine Fisheries Service and Fish and Wildlife Service are highly critical of Army studies estimating
the impacts of oil spills.

Both insist that Army studies:

(1) use cost figures from spills in a less restrictive eco-

system (i.e. the ocean rather than estuarine areas), (2)
"substantially underestimated the impact of petroleum on
oyster seed beds and other marine life using safe levels of
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petroleum contamination considerably higher than literature
supports",94 and (.3) lack recognition of the value of resources
in the lower Bay and their. vulnerability to predictable
refinery related spills.
The two services relief on a body of oil toxicity
studies conducted by VIMS on the

~hesapeake

Bay as well as

similar works conduc t.ed by Woods Hole and ot.her oceanographic
institutions.

Their data did not support the Corps' oil

impact evaluation.

The Corps was criticized for selectively

choosing baseline data which at times was extremely outdated
(same references pre-date 1930) and geographically irrelevant
(nalveston Bay, Texas).

95

As a result, tremendous dis-

crepancies existed between the conclusions of the Army and
those of other agencies.
Economic Impacts
Economic evaluation of the commer-cial resources and
associated industries present yet another area of dispute.
Opposition to the refinery

contin~ally

emphasized the verity

of commercial fisheries value against the questionable economic
benefits which would be attributable to the refinery.
Approximately 23,200 individuals are employed either
full or part-time as commercial fishermen, while perennial
employment in the 373 fish processing plants accounts for
7,363 jobs increasing to 10,154 during peak seasons.
Dockside vqlue of the shellfish harvested in 1977 is $78

n i:10n. 96

m1

Oil spill damage to these industries is difficult to
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predict because it would depend on the time of year, the volume
and type of spill, geographical location, meteorological and
oceanic conditions as well as clean up capacity at the time
of the spill.

The interdependence of the industries, however,

along with the large numbers of people affected led NOAA, EPA,
and Dor to believe ".:hat the cost of a catastrophic spill would
exceed the positive economic benefits generate'\i by the r-ef Lnerv ,
~tuch

discussion of economic benefit has been based

on the advantages of locati.ng a refinery near its market.
However, the current demand for petroluem and derivative products, with the exception of crude and residual fuel oil,
has not been established within the Hampton Roads area.
Hence, analysis of economic return is purely speculative.
Alternative Sites
In May, 1978, the Chief of the Corps, Lt. Gen. John
Morris, concluded that refinery alternatives had not been
sufficiently studied.

The Army, therefore, appointed an inter-

agency task force, including representatives

fJ~om

the Depart-

ments of Interior, Energy, Transportation, the EPA, NOAA,
and COE, to evaluate 69 potential alternative refinery sites
fram Maine to Florida using environmental, economic and engineering criteria.

A series of descriptions were generated

which included many of the pUblic interest factors and were
used to

comp~re

sites.

See Table 6 for a list of descriptors.
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TABlE 6

categories

Ecanrn1i.cs

General
Descriptors

Specific
Descriptors

Site

Land costs
Envirormmt mi.tigation
costs
Utility costs

Operation

Location construction

factor
Crude receiving cost
Product receiving cost
Market relationship
Enviroment

Physical

Air quality
Water supply
Noise
Waste disposal
Potential for oil spi.Ll s
Dredging
Spoil disposal
Flood plains
FloCd hazards

EcolocJical

Threatended or endanqered species
Terrestrial species
Aquatic species
Crucial habitats
Wetlands

Socdoeoorzmi.c

Agricultural lard
Ccmnercial fisheries
Sport fisher.i.es
Recreaticn
Land use
State/local governtrent approvaf,

-
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TABLE 6 -- continued

Categories

General

Descriptors
Socioeconani..c oontinued

Specific
Descriptors
Energy needs

Regional ecoron:ics
Historical/archaeological sites
Aesthetics

SOURCE: Office of the Chief of Engineers, Final Supplement
to the Final Environmental Impact Statement; HRECots Portsmouth
Refinery and Terminal, Portsmouth, Virginia, December, 1978, Washinton D.C. pp. 1-9

Of the 69 sites.

19 were selected to.be considered in more detail. 97
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The results, as interpreted by NOAA and DOl, indicated that
Hampton Roads was the

l~ast

environmentally acceptable of

the 19 sites.
While the conclusions of the task force indicated that
Hampton Roads was a poor site from an environmental point
of view, there was no agreement on a remedial course of
action.

HREC insisted no alternative site was feasible and

furthermore, that no studies had been conducted to document possible adverse state or local socio-economic considerations that would render these sites infeasible for
'
re f 1nery
construe t '1on. 98

'
Th e consensus among t h
e OppOS1-

tion, however, was that the task force conclusions should
have been the final factor which would persuade the Army
to deny the permit on grounds of environmental consideration.
A NMFS report best summed up the opinions of the dissenters
"NMFS recog;}.izes the need for petroluem modernization and
expansion but such industrial complexes should not be located
I

within the confines of a productive and fragile estuarine
environment. ,,99
Summary of the Conflict
While all parties found support for their arguments in
the Corps' public interest policies, the conclusions drawn
were completely divergent.

The proponents of the refinery

based their case on national need issues, local economic
benefits to the city of Portsmouth and the State, and pollution control technology.

The opponents, on the other hand,
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questioned the real national need for the complex and the
validity of local benefit calculations.

Furthermore, they

contended that natural resource values, oil spi.ll frequency
and toxicity studies were underestimated and therefore,
the respective pUblic interest factors could not be adequately
repr·!!sented.
Henc:e, the aampton Roads refinery pzoj e.ct; posed a
very difficult permitting case for the Corps.

Faced with

conflicting public interest factors, the Corps first, had
to initiate an intricate weighing process to determine if
the benefits of the proposed complex reasonably balanced
against the forseeable detriments; and second, to grant or
deny' ·the permits based on the outcome of this balancing
process.
Decision Rationale
The major factors of public

interl~st

considered by

the Corps in the Hampton Roads case are listed below.

A

brief discussion of the Corps' decision making rationale
accompanies each public interest factor.
Public Interest Factors
Wetlands
While the wetlands on the site are considered important by the Army, the revised application submitted by HREC
would avoid construction in wetlands along tidal creeks
adjacent to the tributaries.

-.-'

Although 8 acres may be
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affected by reducti.on in fresh water flow due to alteration

--

of drainage patterns during constructioni the Army determined that this was an acceptable impact.

I OO

Landuse, Aesthetics, and Recreation
The HREC site is zoned for industrial use.

Accord-

ingly, the1\rmy assumed the refinery would be compatible with
current land use plans.

The FElS states that occasional

flares from the refinery would cause unpleasant odors
moderate discomfort during periods of
rapid dissipation is expected.

ai~

a~d

inversion, however,

No significant impairment

to recreational boating appears probable.

I OI

Water Supply
Due to the steadily decreasing aquifer, the Virginia
State Water Control Board (SWCB) has declared the South Hampton Roads region a "ground water management area".

The City

of Portsmouth, located in this region, obtains 20 percent of
its water supply from ground water sources.

Many believe

that the new refinery, which will require two million gallons
of potable water per day, will only exacerbate the area's
chronic water problems.

The Portsmouth City manager, however,

testified that the City's water system had a sufficient yield
to satisfy demand including HREC's through the year 2000.
Furthermore, the city offered to use water from surface impoundments in order to meet the refinery's need.
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Although the Corps expressed some concern over the
adequacy of the water supply, it declined to consider it a
factor of pUblic interest.

The Corps determined that federal
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review was inappropriate since the city of Portsmouth has
full jurisdiction over its water supply.
Water· Qua·lity
The Virginia SWCB is responsible for ensuring that
permit applications are in compliance with applicable effluent
limit~tions,
~ent

water quality standards, and required manaqe-

practices.

EPA, however, retains authority under the

FWPCA to veto permits which are not in compliance with the
guidelines and requirements of the Act.
The Board issued to HREC the NPDES permit for the
refinery and set limits on the amount of wastewater effluent
that the refinery may legally discharge into the Elizabeth
River.

EPA declined to veto the permit indicating to the

Corps that possible degradation of water quality was an
. k • 103
accepta bl e r 1.5
Dredging
Although dredging would permanently destroy 37 acres
of productive shallow water habitat', the impacts to viota
from increased turbidity, resuspension of heavy metals and
higher biological oxygen demand would be shortlived.

Both

the SWCP and the Virginia Marine Resources Commission (VMRC)
issued the State dredging permits with the provision that
the refinery proposal incorporated the following stipulations:
1.

installation of an adequate spill containment
system commensurate with the best state-of-the-art
equipment,
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2.

prohibition of dredging during months corresponding with spawning and larval development,

3.

compliance by the permitee with all water
quality standards established by the SWCB and
all other laws affecting the project and
effluent.

I 04

The Corps also reviewed the dredging proposal from its
traditional area of expertise, navigation.

The subsequent

evaluation revealed that navigation would not be hindered by
construction and operation of the proposed refinery.

Since

the appropriate state permits had been granted, the Corps
concluded that the dredging action itself would not be
contrary to the public interest.
Air Quality and Health
Although the Hampton Roads area

alrea~y

poor air quality, the State Air Pollution

exhibits

Con~rol

(SAPCB) found that operation of the facility

Board

~ould

not vio-

late National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) provided
that an emission offset was developed.

Offsets are part of

the Virginia state air quality plan required by the Clean
Air Act.

The Virginia SAPCB is required to develop and adopt

a state implementation plan (SIP) setting forth the necessary
control efforts to achieve compliance with the NAAQS.I05
The plan prohibits new major stationary sources or modification of sources in regions of a state which are not in
compliance with these national standards.

However, offsets -
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emission reductions that would not otherwise be required can be used to allow industrial development in areas of noncompliance. 10 6

Offsets oblige potential industry to make

additional~ommitments to

pollution control so that the net

effect from the ap?roval of a new source will not increase

.
107
po 11utLon.
In the case of the Hampton Roads area, the
entailed reducing hydrocarbon emissions.

off~et

The tradeo££

~e-

quires the Virginia Department of Highways and Transportation
to change from oil-based asphalt to water-based asphalt in
the eastern half of the State. lOB
The offset plan was submitted to EPA and eventually
received approval indicating to the Corps that health
considerations were satisfied at both the Federal and State
levels.
Fish and Wildlife
The impacts discussed thus far were found by the Corps
to be within the parameters of Federal, state and local
requirements.
pacts to

fis~
I

However, determining whether ornot the imand wildlife resources were within these para-

meters proved to be much m()re difficult.

In particular,

the Corps had difficulty in evaluating impacts from oil spills.
AccordinglYr the staff examined the issue of oil spill
probability and oil tcxicity

caref~lly

before addressing

fish and wildlife impacts.
Oil Spill Analysis
The Corps determined that impacts resulting from

71
chronic spillage during oil transfer operations would be
negligable.

This conclusion was based on the expected success

of pollution control equipment employed at the refinery.
The Corps, however, acknowledged that major spills could
cause substantial damage to important commercial and recreational fishing operations and decided to evaluate the
probabilities of such a spill.

The resultant:. document did

not attempt to generate new probability statistics but instead, consolidated the existing information

in

this area

pertaining to the Hampton Roads refinery.
The document was highly critical of the ECO report
and disputed many of the basic assumptions.

The Corps found

fault with ECOts use of statistical data and failure to
account for new pollution prevention legislation, regulations and technology in its probability anaylsis.

In

response to the ECO report, the Corps concluded the following:
Major oil spill probabilities ranging from I
in 50 years to 1 in 335 years are presented.
They (ECO) use historical, worldwide, U.S.-wide
or localized data bases. The data base will
affect the probability. For example, if we use
Hampton Roads historical data, then the probability for a major oil spill would be zero.
Furthermore, probabilities using historical
data bases are not reliable. Probabilities must
reflect site specific conditions and future
technology, regulation, legislation, etc. However, the methodology does not exist to consider
all these factors and to arrive at a reasonable
probability. We believe that the probability
presented in the ECO report, I major spill every
50 years is too high and the probability of I in
335 years is too low. We further recognize that
no prediction of the probability of a major spill
is reliable.
The oil spill probability statistics used by the
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Corps and confidence in the Coast Guard's ability to prevent
or control pollution incidents influenced the Army's ultimate decision to grant permits.

Under the Ports and Water-

ways Safe.ty Act, the Coast Guard Captain of the Port is given
broad authority to establish vessel traffic systems, control
vessels in the nation's ports and waters and to otherwide
improve the safety of marine transport in order to reduce
th e

'b'l't
1 1 Y

poss~

0

f po1 1
'
"'
den t s. 110
ut10n
caus1ng
1nC1

T0

curtail oil spill damage, the Coast Guard has implemented a
sophisticated Pollution Information Reporting System capable
of providing on request summary and specific information such
as cause, size and location of all spills in .U .. S.• Waters.
On this basis the Army assumed that the pollution prevention
and control techniques carried out by the Coast Guard
would reduce the risks of oil spills and their impacts to·
an acceptable level.

Furthermore, based on a worst case

situation, a major oil spill in the vicinity of the oyster
beds, the Corps data indicated that impacts would not be
,
'bl e. III
1rreverS1
Oil Spill Impacts
The Corps addressed oil impacts in its Washington
level evaluation.

While the report acknowledged the potential

adverse effects, it disagreed with NMFE, FWS and VIMS data
on toxicity levels.

In drawing conclusions, the Corps relied

heavily on a study presented at a Conference on Prevention
and Control of Oil.

The conference study indicated that

oysters were much more resilliant to the effects of oil

7'6
t use d 'Dy
compound s t a
ana
h n da

0

ther aqencz.es
. .a n d ia.ca t e d . 112

The Corps rejected a newly pUblicized report concerning oil toxicity studies.

The report presented evidence that

much smaller amounts than previously determined could be
lethal to oysters.

The study concluded that a relatively

mi.noz oil spill, approxin.ately 1,000 barrels could harm

Delaware Bay oysters.
The zepor c was submitted to the sec.recary of the Army,
Clifford

Alexande~

by the Interior Secretary, Cecil Andrus

in a final effort to prevent approval of the $600 million
refinery project.

The 1967 MOU reuqired Alexander to review

the document before finalizing his decision to grant the
permits.

While Alexander did not dispute the validity of

the study, he determined that the findings were not applicable to the Hampton Roads situation.

His conclusion was

based on the differences between the two environments, the
Chesapeake and Delaware Bays and the questionable applicability of the test conditions to the Hampton Roads situation.
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Furthermore, the Corps did not view t.he oil refinery
as an operation which wou Id automatically curtail the viability
of important bay fisheries.

While oil spills could cause

some damage to fisheries, the extent would range from minor
to severe depending on the conditions.

This damage, however,

is not necessarily irreversible especially i:!1 the cases of
non catastrophi.c spills.

The Corps also poLnt.ed out that the

threat of a major spill is not a new hazard.

Crude oil and

refined products are presently transitting the area.
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The Corps therefore decided that the fisheries and refinery
· • 114
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. Na·tional Benefits
supporters and opponents disagreed over the refinery's
potential contribution to national security, the balance of
payments and the costs of refined petrolewn products for
East Coast consumers.

The Corps Examined both sides of the

argument and

that while some national benefits

conclude~

could result from the project, there was no absolute national
115
"
nee d f or t h e propose d re f 1nery.
The Corps acknowledged that storage capacity at the
refinery could contribute to national security by adding
stocks to the Strategic Petrolewn Reserve and it would also
reduce import of refined product from foreign sources.

How-

ever, the overall impact to national security, although positive, would be tiny, and denial of the refinery permits
wou ld not re d uce th e current 1eve 1

0f

.
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The Corps warned against discussing the refinery's benefits
in terms of balance-of-payments explaining:
Over the long run, with or without the refinery,
the nation~s international payments will roughly
balance .••• If the benefits of the refinery to the
nation do not exceed its costs, it should not be
undertaken simply because it
reduce the flow
of dollars into foreign hands.

Wilt

Furthermore, the Corps questioned DOE'S statements
concerning the need for new refineries.

While DOE made a

persuasive qualitative case for additional East Coast
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refinery capacity, the Corps claimed that the Department
by no means established that the United States
economy would be crippled in any fundamental sense
without additional East Coast refineries~ and therefore, it has not demonstrated that there is any
absolute need for such capacity.11S
Regarding local need, the Corps, recognized that some
economic banefits, principally in the form of tax dollars,
would result from the refinery.

However, the FEIS and its

supplement presented no evidence that unemployment in either
the construction industry or the Portsmouth area would be
reduced by the proposed refinery.

There was no basis for

the claim, the Corps concluded, that jobs created by

t~e

construction and operation of the refinery would constitute
"
1 b ene f"1t. 119
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Recognizing that there was neither an absolute need,
nor quantitative evaluation of the potential national benefits
and costs, the Department of Army developed National Economic
Development (NED) estimates to determine some of the benefits and costs of the

p~oposed

refinery.

The NED evaluation

was designed to provide a limited appraisal of the economic
benefits for the refinery from a national perspective.
Measured benefits were defined as the difference in total
transportation costs for refined petroleum products sold
on the East Coast with or without the proposed refinery.
Measured costs were defined as the difference in total costs
of oil spills in United States waters with or without the
proposed refinery.

Based on the NED analysis the Corps

concluded that the economic benefits to the nation would

outweigh": th.e costs of non catastrophic oil spills.

The

report, however, pointed out that economic benefits accruing
from the refinery would be forgone if a large catastrophic
1
01"I SP1"were
to 1
occur'1n the

lo~er

Chesapeake Bay area. 120

After initially reviewing the case, the Chief of
Engineers decided that additional information on alternative
sitE locations was necessary to reach a decision on the permit
and to comply with NEPA.

While the results of the study

indicated that environmentally more acceptable sites exist,
NEP~"does

not mandate that the most environmentally superior

site is chosen.

Rather NEPA requires that alternatives are

sufficiently considered to permit a reasoned choice.
sequently, the purpose of the project was to Pfovide
information which could be useful in
to the Portsmouth site.
with the

in~or.mation

evaluatin~r

Conadditiona~

alternatives

The aim was to provid.e the Corps

necessary to determine whether or not

to grant the Hampton Roads permits.
Surunary
The controversial Hampton Roads project presented the
Corps with an extremely difficult public interest decision.
Both sides had pUblic interest factors in their favor to
buttress th~ir argmnents.

Both enjoyed support from vocal

and emotional consti tuenciE!s.
In the final evaluation, the Chief of the Engineers

BD
concluded:
I have examined the entire case and concluded that
the issuance of the permit with the attached conditions is in the pUblic interest. I've carefully
considered and weighed the factors of the public
interest and found trlat the benefits of the proposal
outweigh the adverse impacts. I particularly note
that the beneficial results are certain while the
adverse environmental are mostly speculative with
regard to occurance ~nd degree of damage. Also, the
probability of occurance of most adverse impacts
can be reduced by enforcements of applicable laws
and regulations, appropriate permit conditions and
application of modern technology.12l
After much deliberation, the Secretary of the Army
concurred with this determination.

In a summary statement,

he cited the following reasons as key determinants for his
de~ision.

1.
The refinery and marine terminal
construction should meet the highest state-of-theart standards for safety, efficiency, and environmental safeguards.
2.
All State permits for the facility
have been issued, .•• attesting to its compatibility
with air and water quality standards.
3.
Construc~ion of an oil refinery in
Portsmouth, Virginia, would not violate any known
national policy or law.
4.
The refinery would be consistent with
national energy goals, specifically, it will be
capable of producing low sulfur fuels and unleaded
gasoline from sour crude feedstock e .
5.
The Virginia State and local governments support construction of the refinery.
6.
The proposed location, while not potentially the most environmentally superior site, is
not the most environmentally damaging site; and,
when viewed in its entirety, is one of the best
locations on the east coast for a refinery and
terminal complex.
7.
The economic benefits to the Nation
from the refinery would outweigh the costs of noncatastrophic oil spills that could potentially
impact the Hampton Roads area.
B.
The potential for oil s~i~l~ (b~sed
on statistical probabilities) would d~m~n~~h ~n
the upper Chesapeake Bay area with the ref~nery.
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9.
We believe that the highly valuable
crab and oyster resources would not be totally destroyed, even if a large, uncontained oil spill
were to occur.
10.
The channel size and botton characteristics of the port, ••• mitigate against the
probability of a major pollution-causing accident
occurring in the harbor area.
11.·
The econo~ic benefits which could
accrue from the refinery would be foregone if
a large catastrophic oil spill were to occur in
the lower Chesapeake Bay area. This is the gut
. issue on which the decision to grant or deny hinges.
Is the low probability of risk which could
potentially seriously impact a high quality resource
worth taking given the otherwise certain and substantial national benefit which would accrue from
construction and operation of a refinery in
Portsmouth, Virginia?122
Secretary Alexander concluded that the risk was worth taking.
As demonstrated in this chapter, the correct public
interest decision in the Hampton Roads case was far from
obvious.

The lengthy evaluation prior to the final determin-

ation supports this conclusion.

Although in the last analysis,

the Corps determined that the public interest would best
be served by granting the permits, the opposition presented
very convincing evidence to the contrary.

Further in for-

mation is, therefore, necessary to fully evaluate corps'
decision.

The following discussion will focus on the

adequacy with which the Corps implemented the public interest
program in the Hampton Roads project, problems in the
pUblic interest program and suggestions for change.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Implementation Adequacy
Compliance with Regulation
The Corps complied with all legislative requirements
pertaining to the Hampton Roads case.

Pursuant to the FWCA

and MOU, the Corps consulted with the Department of Interior
throughout the history of the project.

In fact, the Secre-

tary of the Army delayed his official determination until
the Secretary of Interior could register his final comments.
NEPA requirements were fulfilled when the Corps filed
an environmental

i~pact

statement for the proposal.

Although

the statement was found to inadequately address alternatives,
the Corps remedied this problem by conducting a separate
alternative study.
The

require~ents

of the FWPCA and CAA were also upheld.

The Corps evaluated the probable impacts resulting from the
section 404 dredge and

fil~_

permit and determined that little

permanent damage would occur.

In yarticular, no wetlands

would be destroyed and drec'.ge material disposal posed no problems.

Regarding the CAA, the Cor2s made sure its permit

issuance did not hinder the' implementation of the Act's provisions.

Accordingly, when the Army permits were granted, their
82
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issuance remained contingent upon EPA approval of the
Virginia offset program.
Furthermore, the Corps fulfilled all the public interest review requirements.

It specifically addressed each factor

listed in the regulations and gave special emphasis to those
most important in the Hampton Roads project.

After applying

the four public review criteria, the Corps determined the
following:
1.

The relative extent of the public and private need
for the proposed structure;
As to the demand for refinery output, we kno~ that
the East Coast demand for product far exceeds
its refinery capacity. Certainly,a source of
supply closer to the market is more cost - and
energy - effective. As for the future trends in
crude receipts and refined product demand, issues
concerning the acceptability of reliance on
specific foreign sources and for what amounts
of oil, are matters to be decided outside the
scope of the Army permit process. We know
that there is insufficient u.s. refinery capacity
to process sour crude feedstock and produce
low sulfur fuels and unleaded gitsoline.123

2.

The desirabili.ty of using appropriate alternative
locations and methods to aCGomplif:1h the objective of
the proposed

~tructure

or work;

NEPA does not require that the least environmentally damaging location be adopted for the proposed
project.

It requ i re s only t.hat reasonable alternatives

are examined and that information gained from the study
will help determine whether or not the selected site is
suitable for the project.

After reviewing the special
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alternative site study, the Secretary of the Army
concluded;
I am convinced that only four of the alternative
sites explored .• ~compare favorably to the
Portsmouth site when considering the relevant
factors in toto; that none of these four is,
however, clearly preferable to the Portsmouth
site •••• 124
3.

The extent and permanence of the bene f Lo La I and/or
detrimental effects which the proposed structure or
work may have on the public and private user to which
the area is suited;
The Corps evaluation indicated that chronic
spills associated with routine oil transfer operations
or other accidental refinery discharges would not increase in the Bay due to th6 terminal's pollution
control equipment.

Catastrophic spills, although con-

sidered to be highly improbable could potentially impact the James River oyster grounds but the Corps
believed that the
b e d s.
4.

ov~rall

effect would not destroy the

125

The probable impact

~f

each proposal in relation to

the cwmnulative effe,:t created by existing and anticipated structures of work in the area;
In response to this criterion, the Corps offered
the following comment:
We believe that oil spills will increase
in the Hampton Roads and lower Chesapeake
Bay areas because of the increased traffic but
will decrease in the Upper Bay area due to the
replacement of product tankers with barge
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With regard to

tl~is

last statement, it should be

noted that U. S. Coast Guard data overwhelmingly refutes the
premise that barges have lower s?ill probabilities than
ta:lkers.

In fact, tank barges i:l general have a much higher

accident rate than tankels of similar capacity.127
While disagreement with the Corps' pUblic interest
determination and evaluation methodologies may be valid,
nevertheless, the Corps complied with all legislative and
regulatory requirements.

Furthermore, its decision making

rationale appears to be consistent with past cases and can
be supported by them.
Relation to Past Cases
A brief comparison of Zabel v. Tabb, Marco Island
and the Block "M" cases to the Hampton Roads refinery
project reveal a number of striking similarities.

In all

cases, protection of natural resource values was a major
issue.

The public interest regul9tions along with the Fish

and Wildlife Coordination Act, and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act were fundamental in each of the four
decision making processes.

However, resource values in the first

three cases constituted sufficient national pUblic interest
to warrant permit denial, while energy development was
deemed to be of greater importance in the Hampton Roads
case.
The seemingly opposite determinations raise questions
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concerning the Corps' consistency in applying the pUblic
interest review.

A closer comparison of the four cases,

however, reveals substantive differences between the former
and latter.
Chapter III, The Historical Evaluation of Corps'
Acti.vity in the Coastal Zone, reve:aled that wetlands protect.ion is accorded special public interest consideration.
In conformance with this emerging policy, the Corps altered
its regulations to state that wetlands are;
••• environmentally vital areas. They constitute a
productive and valuable public resource, the unnecessary alteration or destru~tion of which
should be discouraged as contrary to the public
interest. 128
Consequently, projects calling for wetlands alteration are

'-

closely scrutinized by the Corps.
The Zabel v. Tabb, Marco Inland and Block "M" cases
required substantial wetlands destruction.
did not successfully demonstrate

th~t

The applicants

their proposals were

of greater national importance than the protection of wetlands.

Hence, all three conflicted with Corps national

public interest policy.
Furthermore, each proposal required wetlands alteration to accomodate some form of waterfront recreational
housing.

The Corps concluded that such development was not

water dependent and therefore did not warrant wetlands
alteration.

Similar development could be located slightly

inland, provide the same function, and afford easy access

87. ,
to the water without widespread wetlands destruction.
Accordingly, the Corps determined that the pUblic interest
would best be served by

p~rmit

denial.

In contrast to the above cases, the Hampton Roads
refinery and marine terminal called for no wetlands alteration.

Consequently, the project did not come in direct

conflict with the specific public interest requirement,
wetlands protection.
much less certain

The impacts to national resources were

in the Hampton Roads example.

Most

of the concern for fisheries and water quality protection
was related to the possibility of impacts from increased
tanker and barge operations.

Not only was the frequency

and 'degree of damage resulting from these operations highly
speculative, but such impacts were secondary to the project.
Furthermore, the proposal's primary or direct impacts
were not considered sufficient enough to warrant denial
based on national factors
The Hampton Roads

~f

public interest.

~efinery

also differs from the

previous cases with respect to locational requirements and
applicable public interest factors.

Unlike the housing

proposals, a marine terminal is a water dependent facility.
The HREC site, which allows easy tanker and barge access,
is physically well suited to the terminal's purpose.
Furthermore the refinery is in accordance with at least
one stated public interest factor, energy development.
Due to the shifting political focus of the U.S. since 1973
from conservation and environmental issues to solving the

88
nation's energy problems, this particular factor of public
interest has gained dramatically in importance.
Finally, the HREC refinery has received support
from both the state permitting agencies and the Governor
of Virginia.

While the Corps could deny the permits

contrary to the staters position, in the absence of overriding national factors of pUblic interest, the regulations specify that the permits should be issued following
the receipt of a favorable state determination. 1 3 0
Table 7 illustrates the aforementioned comparisons.
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Wetlands loss
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nended denial.
EPA reculilended
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The preceding discussion indicates that the Hampton
Roads decision is not only consistent with past cases but
is conqxuous with the public interest energy policy.
The Corps also complied with all mandatory regulations and
legislation.

Hence, in the case of the Hampton Roads re-

finery, the Corps appears t:> have properly Lmp Lemerrced the
public interest program.
But while the final determination is justifiable
in a strict sense, it does not imply that the pUblic
interest decision making process is problem free.

It is

by no means a fail safe mechanism which automatically
ensures that good projects are promoted and bad ones squelched.
The 'broad mandate, complex balancing process, e.Lonq with
other evaluation components makes public interest decision
making sUbject to dispute while often procedurally correct.
The following discussion will delineate some of the problems
specific to the public interest review which were revealed
during the course of this study.
Perceived and Real Problems in the Program
Evaluation of the Mandate
An assessment of the Corps' program necessarily begins
with an inquiry into the concept of pUblic interest.

Political

scientist Glendon Schubert divides the contemporary theories
of pUblic interest into three groups; idealist, rationalist and
realist.
The idealist theory holds that the true public interest rests in the higher, natural law which is separate
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from the administrative process.

The administrator must resist

all political influence and impose on the people what is good
132
for them whether they want the program or not.
Regarding
questions of coastal utilization, those adhering to this
theory argue that natural law is the law of nature and therefore is higher.

Accordingly, most coastal alteration is con-

sidered to be in

~iolation

of the public interest.

The rationalist theory reflects the idealist notion
that the pUblic interest is something separate from and independent of private interests.

Instead, rationalists contend

that there exists a common good that reflects the prescmed
existence of various common interests.

The decision maker is

the·refore charged with faithfully implementing that popular
will. l 33 However, often there is no clearly defined "common
good" or "popular will" that the Corps can follows.

In many

cases, "public interest groups" such as environmental, civil
rights and energy development may be odds
Hence, the Corps is not faced with a

wit~

pop~lar

each other.

will to execute,

but with ar. intense conflict of interests among its various
l 34
"publics" with regard to how the coast should be used.
Realist theorists reject the postulations of both
the idealist and rationalist adherents.

Instead, they

lower expectations regarding what the Corps' procedures are
expected to accomplish.

Although they, like the rationalist,

recognize that the pUblic interest is a collection of special
or selfish

interes~s

they reject the notion that the adminis-

trative process has the capacity to calculate the best, so-
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cially preferred or most efficient use of resources.

Decision

makers therefore function as conflict mediators respecting the
use of rescurces.

135

Rather than calculating or attempting

to represent the pUblic interest, the decision maker simply
becomes the mediator.
As

th~s

discussion indicates the public interest

review, with its broad, all encompassing mandate, is impossible
to define.

In fact, the very concept of public interest varies

from case to case, depending upon the socio-economic parameters at the state, local and national levels.

While such a

mandate enables the Corps to be sensitive to the needs of a
changiBg society, neither the Corps nor the populace are
able to arrive at a public interest consensus, much less
determine the appropriate direction the 'public interest
review should take.
The lack of program direction has led "public
interest" g:;:-oups to define the Corps' program to be congruous
with their particular ideology.

Those supporting environ-

mental initiatives have viewed the pUblic interest provisions
to be synonomous with conservation and preservation directives.
According to regulations, however, the public interest covers
the entire gamut of issues.

It is not intended that the Corps

should advocate anyone particular factor.
Besides presentin9 definitional problems, the broad
mandate leads to other difficulties as well.
directS:.

The mandate

the Corps to consider and balance all factors

relevant to a given proposal.

Provided that the Corps

examines each factor and complies with other regulatory requirements nearly any decision the Agency makes will be legally justifyable.

Consequently, execution of the public

interest mandate could be reduced to a procedural exercise
merely providing a mechanism for the justification of both
good and bad decisions.
E17.a:~uation

of the Decision Making Process

The troubles inherent in the Corps' pUblic interest
mandate also impact the decision making process.

Becau$e

the broad directive requires the Corps to evaluate and
balance a plethora of factors unique to each case, specific
implementation guidelines are unable to provide the organization

with the flexibility necessary to carry out its ambi-

tious program.

The Corps, therefore, has no implementation

framework.
Critics have suggested that

quan~itative

analysis

would enhance the program's reliability by providing an
impl~~entation

framework.

They contend that traditional

cost/benefit studies, employed in the Corp's civil works
programs shculd become the guidelines for the pUblic interest
review.

HO\\lever, upon close examination, cost/benefit anal-

ysis is not invulnerable to outside criticism or to differing
calculations.

Disagreement among experts is common.

Much

depends upon who does the calculati.ons and which factors are
"
considered
as bene f'~ts and wh"1C h as cos t s. 136
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analysis is also unsuitable for public interest review because
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it neglects or underestimates many factors including environmenta~

intangibles such as aesthetics.

Consequently, a

decision based soley on cost/benefit studies will often be
an inadequate indicator of the public interest.

For these

reasons, the Corps has only utilized cost/benefit analysis
. 1neres
. t
t d eC1S10n
..
.
. . t ed b
' 13 7
rnak 1ng
on a 1 1m1
aS1S.
f or pu'bl 1C
Lacking implementation guidance, the Corps executes
the program in the fashion 'advocated .by proponents of the'
realist ·theory.

The Corps functions as a mediator or clear-

inghouse for pUblic and agency comment.

The actual review

procedure supports this observation.
corps' regulations direct the District Engineers
to consider and weigh conservation, economics, aesthetics,
history, navigation, water quality and environmental values.
Because of the inherent difficulties in attempting to reflect
these values within a single organization, the Corps circulates
permit app Li.ca t.Lons among various other concerned federal,
state and local agencies as well as interest groups.

Various

reviewers examine the permit request from different perspectives and accordingly, different emphases:.
land use; state

natura~

local governments-

resource agencies - water quality and

wetlands protection; st:ate economic development agencies port development;

u.s.

FWS - fish and wildlife values; the

EPA - environmental protection; and citizen groups - special
.
t
1nteres

5.
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This procedure! has been criticized as ad hoc or
haphazard and in any event, unable to reflect the public
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interest factors.

However,b¥. injecting a healthy eclecti-

cism into the review process, the above procedure is
a major strength in a regulatory program which lacks formal implementation guidelines.
The concesuions arrived at in the Hampton Roads
exanlple

demonstrat~

the program's strength.

~hese

concessions

took the form of a state-of-the-art oil spill containment
system, dredging requirements to

mitigat~

impacts to natural

resources, and the sewage treatment plan previously discussed.
Each was incorporated into the proposal as a result of the
pUblic interest review indicating that the oppositions concerns
did not go unheeded.

Instead, the decision making process

resulted in a compromise, which pursuant to the public interest review and pertinent legislation discussed, would
miti.gate fish and \'Tildlife impacts and simultaneously allow
for energy development.
Evaluation of Factors Outside
the Jurisdiction of the Corps
The adequacy of pUblic interest

dete~inations

may

be affected when permits for a project are also required
from state, local or other federal agencies.

Theoretically,

these agencies have regulatory requirements which ensure that
impacts within their pervue will be properly evaluated.

How-

ever, in some instances, the parameters directing the regulatory programs of these agencies may be too restrictive preventing them from executing decisions in accordance with
their mandate.

In this case, agencies may rely on the Corps
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pUblic interest review to rectify the inadequacies of their
own permi t

p~ograms.

EPA encountered this dilemma in the Hampton Roads
refinery proposal.
the

regulato~y

diction.

In this example, HREC complied with all

requirements within the limits of EPA's juris-

consequent.Ly , against its own best interests, EPA

granted the appropriate permits (see pp. 73-4).

Unable to

halt the project at its level of review, EPA sought to prevent
the proposal through the Corps' public interest review and
therefore urged the Corps to deny the dredge and fill permits.
Furthermore, state, local and federal agencies vulnerable to political pressure may purposefully shun their
permit responsibilities.

Well aware of the second level of

review conducted by the Corps, these agencies may perform
Lnade quat.e pe rmf, t analysis and depend upon t.he Corps to
remedy their poor, politically motivated decisions.
Unfortunatelly, the Corps can not use its pUblic
interest review to evaluate the decision making processes of
other agencies.

Consideration of such factors are beyond

the jurisdiction of the Corps.
on the

integ~ity

Instead, the Corps must rely

of the state, local or federal agency deci-

sion making and assume that permits granted by these agencies
indicate the acceptability of potential impacts.

If, however,

other permit agencies are unable Qr unwilling to take the
consequences of unpopular decisions, the effectiveness of
the pUblic interest review will be reduced.
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The role of scientific information in decision
making processes can also have an effect on the public
interest review.

This is particularly true when the infor-

mation is used to evaluate secondary and cummulative impacts.
The Corps received extensive comments concerning
its evaluation of secondary and cumulative impacts to shellfish in the Hampton Roads, water related recreational opportuni ty in the lower Chesapeake Bay and in genE'ral the quality
of human life in the region.

NOAA, DOl, local shellfisher-

men alliances, and public interest groups

acc~sed

the Corps

of significantly underestimating these impacts as well as
the probability of impact occurance.

Accordin.gly, they con-

cluded that the public interest determination was biased.
Comparative oil spill incidents were sited by these organizations substantiating their

clai~s.

Ad~iti~nally,

VIMS

and other reputable scientific institutions produced reports
which indicate thai: impacts may be greater than the Corps
anti.cipated"
However, accident rate pr::>babilities do not provide
a sound basis from which to estimate secondary and cumulative
impacts.

Present t.eohno Loqy does no t; allow forcasting pro-

bable future effects with total certainty.

Hence the analyst

or decision maker must rely not only on current professional
techniques but reasonable judgemen"t.

The data used by the

ev~luations

indicates that impacts

Corps and its own staff

and probabilities would be less substantial than was

99

expressed by the opposition.
In light of scientific di.screpancies, one can question
the adequacy with which the Corps evaluated potential impacts
to the resources of the Bay and the quality of human life.
Howevsr, no discussion can unambiguously address this issue
for a

numbe~

of

reas~ns.

Science is
seems

will~lg

~uch

to admit.

less impartial than public opinion
Whether the issue is oil impacts

or wetlands productivity, there are several factors at work
in the translation of scientific information into natural
i h prevents tota 1
,
resource po 1 ~cy
wh 1C

0

b'Ject1v1ty.
..
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First, the best contemporary scientific understandins
..

of natural phenomena may turn out, in the light of later
research, to have been in error.

Consequently, decisions

may be made based in whole or in part on s::::ientific opinion
whose validity may not stand up over time.
Second, whenever the sUbject mattFr is a topic of
political debate, science becomes politicized to some extent
despite the myth that science is apolitical.

The mixing

of political values and scientific data. may come about within
the discipline or through the translation of scientific
into pUblic information.

The scientist who enters into the

public controversy himself often fails to realize the way
in which scientific pe rcept.Lons color his perspective
toward the issues involved.
Indeed, science assumed a controversial role in the
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Hampton Roads decision making process.

The best contemporary

scientific understanding of oil spill impacts, at the time
of the decision, demonstrated no concurrence regarding degree
and longetivity of effect.

Instead two conflicting perspec-

tives concerning impacts and impact probability were supported
by various individuals and organizations within the political
realm.

Inevitably the scientific information which formed

the basis for the Corps' d=cision was not value free.

Given

that decisions are not value free, the problem of determining
at which point subjectivity becomes detrimental still exists.
In summary, the following potential problems exist
in the public interest review program:
1.

The broad mandate makes it impossible to define the
public interest.

This in turn, can confuse the

public's perception of the program's purpose.
also encourages a

procedu~al

It

rather than substantive

ap:?roach.
2.

The decision making process lacks implementation
guidelines which therefore leaves final determinations sUbject to the political,environment.

3.

Agencies with permit responsibilities in conjuction
with the Corps may not be willing or able to' make
sound decisions.

4.

Scientific information is not value free and consequerrt.Ly does not demonstrate agreement concerning
the extent of secondary and cummulative impacts.
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SusgE!stions for Change
Some concerned that envircnmental values were underestimated in the Hampton Roads decision making process have
suggested that EPA or state environmental agencies should
administer the pUblic interest program.

The Corps would

therefore be r.elieved of its public interest responsibilities
and could refocus i t.s attention to navigational

~nd

civil

works programs.
However, program transferral may prove to be an
unsound proposal.

EPA, at present, lacks the expertise and

capacity to take over the enormous task of regulating coastal
and wetlands alterations.

Conversely, the Corps has had

years of experience in this constantly evolving field.

--

Im-

mediate transferral of this expertise and experience to EPA
would be impossible.

~urthermore,

it is

questio~able

whether

or not an environmental advocacy agency should regulate all
development activities in the coastal zone.

Since the pUblic

interest mandate encompasses more than environmental values,
proper recognition must be given to these factors or the
program's mandate will be violated.

Metamorphis of the gen-

eral public interest rE!view into an envaronment.e l, program
could diminish popular and congressional support.
State control of the expanded sections 10 and 404
permit programs would pe disastrous at this time.

States

lack the finances nece$sary to implement these program(and
unless the federal government is forthcoming with such funds,
it is highly unlikely that states would assume administrative
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responsiblility.

Few, if any states have developed the

infrastructure necessary to administer a program as ambitious
as the public interest review.

Finally, states, particularly

those without an approved coastal zone management plan often
lacki.meohanisms to,incor.p.oratenational faotors of pUblic'
interest: into their.' deoision: making process.· Without such
mechanisms, st·ate agencies. will· have difficulty extracting,
themselves'from,local' and'state pressures in order to make
public' interest determinations.·
In'summary~,

no·sin91e agency has either the

exper~

tise oz.: procedures neceasary to' consider the diffuse' and
sometimes: conflictinq "interests as effectively as does the
'i40,
Corps..
Given: that! the Corps is the' most appropriate
agency to' administer: the 'permit/public interest program, the
remainder'of the disoussioniwill·offer suggestions which,
could improve ·the present pzooeas , .
Define' the Public InterestThus - far-,. this. study' has -revealed that the public
interest' is. a vague" ill: defined concepcc While agreement
concerning those factors which contribute to the pUblic interest. may, exist, t.he re is no consensus regarding the program IS
ultimate purpose •.
program~s

Without a specific sense of purpose, the

effectiveness is -diminished ..

At system which ,ranks· public interes-t factors could

alleviate many of the-problems-relating to the broad madate
and: decision, making proceas..

First, it provides the Corps
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with a baseline from which to initiate consistent decision
maki.ng.

Second, it clarif:!.es the program's purpose enabling

the decision maker to become more responsive to the substantive rather than procedural requirements.
Corps' regulations already specifically afford wetlanes protection high prioT;ity.

A tanking

sy~tem

need not

unnecessarily reduce the flexibility needed in public interest
making.

The ranking would still be based on current legis-

lation, court cases and executive orders.

However, it would

reduce the potential for excessive politization.

This policy

provided the Corps with guidelines in the Zabel v. Tabb, Marco
Island and Block PM" decisions.

Such guidelines increase

the predictability of determinations which can prove advantageous to developers and environmentalists alike.

By extra-

polation, a system of relative values for important factors
of pubLao interest would strengthe.n the entire program.
Inplementation of State M.ajor Facility
Siting Programs
In most states, energy facility sites are chosen
according to private sector economic feasibility studies.
After the initial decision to locate has been made, the
applicant announces his plans and initiates the permit
process.

If the proposal involves coastal alteration, then

the Corps is responsible for administering its public interest
review program and holds a pUblic hearing.

At this point,

opposition to the proposal begins to coalesce and prepares

IC:4
for the upcoming battle.
to planned

at~osphere

The result is a reactive as opposed

for decision making.

The implementation of state major facility sitting
programs could help alleviate many of the problems inherent

in reactive decision making.

Certain states, such as Maryland

have already devised and implemented a program.

The Maryland

Major Facility Siting Plan combines the requirements of two
of the State's existing programs; the Coastal Zone Management
Plan and the Power Plant Siting Act.
The plan includes a regional screening process which
examines pertinent data in a particular study region in order
to identify areas most likely to contain suitable sites for
the development of specific major facilities.

The suggestions

are based on predetermined economic, engineering, sociological·
and environmental criteria.

After candidate areas are located,

the program is equipped with a process for resolving major
facility generated conflicts and handbooks for use in assessing fiscal, social and environmental effects of construction,
.
' t enance. 141
operat1on
and
ma1n

Advance facility locational studies would be particularly advantageous to coastal states where conflicts between various uses are great.

Not only would it ensure that

sites chosen best reflect the needs and policies of the state
but it would allow opposition to express concern over particular locations before the private sector has invested in
the site.

This would enable the private sector to choose a

site, which. at best, has public support and, at worst, public
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indifference.

Consequently, regulatory costs and delays

would be minimized while simultaneously serving the public
interest.
Furt.hermore, by designating regions which are optional
for major facility locations, state and local government
can plan for expected impacts and streamline permit proceedures
to accomodate future development.
Finally, major facility siting programs which include
state-local conflict resolution mechanisms, would aid the
Corps in making public interest determinations by resolving
state and local conflicts prior to the federal permit review.
The Corps would therefore be relieved of the difficult task
of overseeing the state's internal conflicts in addition to
its national interest pUblic mandate.
Virginia, which has no coastal zone management
plan or other broad Inanagement mechanism to resolve natural
resou~ce

conflicts and stave off future disputes, would

benefit from a major facility siting program.

Theoretically,

such a plan would have determined whether or not the area
was suitable for an oil refinery and resolved any public
disputes before HREC chose to locate.

Consequently, if the

site was found to be suitable and conflict resolution was
successful, the Corps' public interest review would be
significantly simplified.
In summary, a major facility siting plan presents
a framework for decision making which saves time and money,
allows for the optimal siting of major facilities while min-
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imizing degradation of economically important natural
resources and serving the pUblic interest.
streamline Permit Procedures
The public interest review program's effectiveness
could be SUbstantially increased by reducing delay and inefficiency.

All parties involved considered the requirements

governing the permit process needlessly time consuming and
dissent producing.
for complaint.

However each differed in naming the cause

Some accused the Corps of not exercising its

prerogative to render the decision expiditiously.

Instead,

the Corps afforded the opportunity for all interested agencies
to participate in the process which resulted in significant
delays.

But under the provisions of NEPA, FWCA and the MOU

with 001, the Corps is required to solicit . comments from various agencies with different expertise.

Furthermore, a full

review process provides the greatest assurance that the
pUblic is not only well informed but also that its interest
is best served.
Rather than reducing the Corps pUblic review process,
much delay could be avoided through better federal and state
coordination efforts.

Since the Corps' mandate encompasses

the entire gamut of public interest factors, federal and
state agencies with permit jurisdiction should streamline
their review programs to not only avoid overlap but also to
expedite the review time frame.

.....

-

Specific suggestions for
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improvement would involve an in depth analysis of state and
other federal agency permit procedures and are therefore
beyond the scope of this study.

--------:=====--------~-======-~-_.

__ ..._--

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
In the past, a broad consensus supported the Corps
in i-:.s pursuit of one narrow object.ive, the promotion of
navigation.

Congress and the courts, however, have expanded

the Corps' jurisdiction to receive, one by one, proposals
for waterfront development; to evaluate the environmental,
economic and social ramifications of each, and then to
authorize, reject, or modify each proposal depending upon
whether it is in the public interest.

Because of the all-

inclusiveness of the public interest review, execution by
the Corps of its statutory mandates, once fairly simple has
become extremely difficult. 142
Analysis of the Hampton Roads refinery proposal
reveals the difficulties inherent in the Corps' decision
making process whenever factors of public interest conflict.
In this case, the Corps had to balance several conflicting
factors of public interest, primarily the fish and wildlife
resources of the Chesapeake and the national need for energy
development.

Relying upon extensive comments and reports

from federal and state agencies as well as citizen groups
and staff evaluations, the Corps balanced these factors within
the loose framework of the regulations.

10&

1119

The ultimate decision to grant the permits did not
dismiss the possibility of secondary and cummulative impacts
to natural resources

ot the Chesapeake and the effects of

these impacts on the long term health of Bay dependent
econemies.

The Corps, through its decision making process,

initiated compromises which, from its perspective, would allow
the coexistence of energy development and natural resources.
Weighed against a strong mandate to fulfill energy needs, the
Corps deemed the probabilities of impact were not sufficient
to warrant permit denial.

"

Within the wide parameters of its mandate, the Corps
appears to have properly executed the public interest review •.
The Corps' decision therefore cannot be
procedurally or legislatively incorrect.
determinatio~

decision.

critici~ed

as being

But a justifiable

does not necessarily translate into the best

It does not preclude severe longterm natural

resource and economic impacts.

Because the pUblic interest

regulations "'.re unable to enauze th(.! best decision, they
have been

sUb~ect

to criticism.

In particular, the lack

of implementation guidelines, appears to provide a mechanism
through which complLlnce with procedural requirements takes
the place of substantive review.

However, other factors

extranious tel the Corps' jurisdiction can have negative
impacts on the public interest review.
The public interest program could be improved by
better defining the purpose perhaps through the prioritization

lID
of factors.

Additionally, early state planning could reduce

decision making problems.

In the Hamp\on Roads example, a

state major facility siting plan could have avoided much of
the controversy and resolved the intense conflict of interests
which encompassed the project.

This would result in an

environment much more conducive to
making at the federal level.

responsibl~

decision

Furthermore, state.and federal

initiatives to streamline permit procedures woUld allow the
Corps to expedite the public interest review and conduct
its own analysis of changes necessary to revise applicable
state and federal permitting structures are beyond the scope
of this study.
In conclusion, the broad public interest review is
a device that allows the Corps to weigh all relevant factors
in permit decisions.

Although the review is subject to

,

both definitional and implementational problems, it is an
enormous step in the right direction.

The Hampton Roads

refinery project provides an excellent example to examine
the adequacy with which the Corps implements its program
when factors of public interest

direct~y

conflict.

This

analysis has shown that the Corps has procedurally adhered
to its regUlatory mandate.

However, it is difficult to de-

termine whether or not the decision can be considered good
without a

b~tter

defined pUblic interest purpose.

It should

be noted that implementation problems can be attributed more
to the broad mandate and permitting requirements outside the

III

Corps' juri.sdiction than to the Agency's execut.ion of the
program.

APPENDIX I
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
10/7 4

-.HRE.~C

announces it will build the refinery on 600

acres in the West Norfolk section of
3/75 -

~ortsmouth.

HREC files permit applicat:ion with Corps of Engineers
for dredging and construction.

09/75·-

HREC files permit applications with state air and
water quality control boards.

10/75 -

virginia Marine Resources commission issues state
dredge and fill permit.
State grants air pollution contrel permit.

EPA

objects to permit as illegal in a nonattainrnent area.
11/75 -

Corps pUblishes draft ElS.

01/76

The SWPCB issues permit for compa.ny to build a pier
and marine terminal in Elizabeth

02/76 -

·Rive~.

CARE organizes and becomes a major force against
the refinery.
EPA publishes draft proposal for offset

procedure,

designed to permit industrial expansion in a
nonattainment area.
05/76 -

At public hearing on dredging permit, EPA states
refinery is environmentally unacceptable.
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ll~

05/76 to
,

09/76

HREC considers revision to the project plans, these
include:

point source discharge into Elizabeth

River and, water intake supply from the city of
.Portsmouth.
06/76 -

BREC applies for PSD in accordance with pre- 1977
Clean Air Act provisions.

09/76 -

Environmental information requested from applicant
as a result of questions raised by the general public,
Federal and state agencies and Corps.
The DOl's Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) publicly
opposes the refinery.

02/77 -

SWPCB approves wastewater discharge plan for refinery
but attaches a condition that the company must
devise a way to contain and clean up oil spills.
State submits incomplete offset proposal.

EPA

requests data on projected ozone reduction.
04/77 -

Environmental

infor~ation

received from applicants

consultant, NUS Corporation.
07/77 -

EPA issues PSD permit, to expire January, 1979.
CARE and Virginia Oyster Packers and Planters
Association sue SWCB and HREC in an effort to block
the :!:"efinery.

10/77 -

Final EIS released to public for review and conunent.
SAPCB extends construction permit (and extends
again in 1978) .
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12/77 -

Corps' district engineer recommends denial of
dredging permit, applies to Governor for consent,
Governor objects and appears to favor the project.
submits to EPA amended PSD permit proposal.

02/78 -

Sta~e

03/78 -

Division Engineer overrules District decision.
Depllrtments of Interior, Commerce and EPA challenge
decision.

03/78 -

Matter is referred to Chief of Engineers.

Refinery proponents including

Portsmou~h

Mayor

Richard Davis, meet with White House officials
seeking support for the project.
05/78 -

Chief of the Corps Lt. General John Morris calls
for study to review alternatives to the Portsmouth
site.

09/78 -

Initiates Interagency Task Force.

Corps issues supplemental EIS.

Evaluation of

alternative East Coast sites rates Portsmouth second
worst of 19 sites i.n terms of environmental impact.
DOE representative dissents, calls it the best.
10/78 -

Refinery proponents meet second time with White
House officials.
Offset requirements finalized and published.

11/78 -

Chief of Enqineers' preliminary decision to issue
dredging permit with stipulation that Congress must
deauthorize the Federal anchorage in Elizabeth
River before construction.

Letters to DOE and

other Federal agencies.
12/78 to
01/79 -

001 urges Army to deny permit.

Army and Interior
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officials meet to resolve dispute over Portsmouth
refinery.
01/79 -

2nd District Rep. G. William Whitehurst urges Army
Secretary Clifford L. Alexander to deny dredging
permit.

02/S9 -

HREC requests extension of PSD permit on grounds
that construction could not "commenceu within
approval ti.me peri.od since permit was conditioned
on EPA's approval of offset proposal embodied in
SIP revision, still pending.
4th District Rep. Robert W. Daniel Jr. introduces
legislation to de-authorize anchorage.

03/79 -

Dredging

p~rmit

decision goes to Army Secretary

because of irresolvable disputes between the
Corps and DOl.
05/79 -

EPA completes review of revised PSD proposal, finds
non-compliance with modeling requirements.

Asks

for correction.
Eig~t

federal agencies meet with Army officials

to discuss
08/79 -

~efinery·.

Whitehurst urges Alexander to consider federal
reports saying that the country's existing refineries
need to expand before new ones are built.

10/79 -

VAPCR extends HREC's state air emmissions permit
until oc cobex 1981.
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Alexander announces that he will not approve the
dredging permit unless he receives overriding
"new elements of opposition".
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